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METAETHICS, ONTOLOGY, AND EPISTEMOLOGY IN AMERICAN 
SOCIOLOGY: EMILE DURKHEIM AND GILLES DELEUZE 
 
For over one hundred years, leading sociologists have criticized their own discipline for 
its “moralistic identity” and its “scientistic rationale.” These markers directly reflect the 
first principles of the modern institutions of sociology. Metaethical commitments to 
moral realism, ontological commitments to transcendental forms, and epistemological 
commitments to a deductive-nomological logic, all first articulated by Emile Durkheim, 
became the foundation of American sociology. These commitments informed our 
answers to the intellectual, organizational, and sociocultural requirements for the 
institutionalization of a new academic science. Gilles Deleuze offers a different set of 
commitments. His metaethics suggests a new approach to our identity as  interventionists. 
His ontology and epistemology supports an enhancement and expansion of our 
quantitative warrants.  
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
For over one hundred years, leading sociologists have criticized their own discipline for 
what I will call its “moralistic identity” and its “scientistic rationale.” These markers 
directly reflect the first principles of the early institutions of sociology. Metaethical 
commitments to moral realism, ontological commitments to transcendental forms, and 
epistemological commitments to a deductive-nomological logic, all first articulated by 
Durkheim, became the foundation of American sociology. These commitments informed 
our answers to the intellectual, organizational, and sociocultural requirements for the 
institutionalization of a new academic science. However, these same commitments also 
led to a field that has never been able to shed charges of moralism and scientism.  
Gilles Deleuze offers a different set of commitments which, I will argue, can expand and 
enhance sociological theory and practice. First, Deleuze’s metaethical commitments can 
lead to moral interventions that are less moralistic. Second, his ontological and 
epistemological commitments support a methodology designed to simulate complex 
social systems. The combination of our traditional linear methods and the new methods 
of agent-based modeling offer new insights into non-linear social systems.  
 
The tradition of crisis literature in sociology 
There is a tradition of crisis literature in sociology; a tradition of internal criticism of 
scientism and/or moralism in our discipline. I begin with these problems as defined by 
some of the leading sociologists of the past one hundred years. My claim is that an 
examination of our foundational philosophical tenets reveals problems of inconsistency 
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and inaccuracy, the historical source of these problems, and their prevalence in sociology 
today. 
Sociology in the United States has a grand tradition of the letting of blood, but in our case 
we bleed the doctor. Sociology often calls for either the purge of some impurity or the 
grafting of new appendages to the body sociological. Many bemoan what they see as the 
splintering of sociology into subfields that become blurred with other fields, such as 
psychology, social work, or economics. Some might say that there is scarcely a coherent 
body to be found in our discipline today; we are all limbs and no trunk.  
A review of the major books in the “Crisis of Sociology” tradition of the last 100 years 
reveals two recurring concerns, one cardiometric, and the other alimentary. The first 
problem is that we have either too much heart or no heart at all. We have not found the 
Aristotelian mean of virtuous action. Instead, depending upon the observer’s standpoint, 
our actions are vicious because we are at one end of the continuum (amoral, apolitical, or 
supporters of the status quo) or the other (moralizing and ideologically self-righteous). 
The alimentary problem is the perception of an ideological hold of a quantitative 
methodology that chokes off our ability to ingest any revolutionary approaches.  
As we will see, the authors in this tradition have addressed one or the other of these 
concerns, and sometimes both. These authors are not knife-wielding radicals or 
barbarians at the gates. They include some of the most successful and respected 
sociologists in our discipline. For example, many were American Sociological 
Association (ASA) Presidents. I will focus on a short list of major books in this tradition.  
We begin with those who argued, pro and con, for sociology’s moral duty. In Liberation 
Sociology, Joseph Feagin and Hernan Vera prescribed an overt moral stance that required 
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an identification and empathy with the victims of oppression, and a moral duty to liberate 
them from misery and inequality (2001:25). In an ASA Presidential Address, Michael 
Burawoy called for a public sociology that should make public issues out of private 
troubles, “thus regenerating sociology’s moral fiber” (2005:260). 
There were those who questioned our ability to meet this moral duty. C. Wright Mills 
saw an abstracted empiricism that forestalled the practice of a liberation sociology. He 
suggested that we should be armed with some level of warranted moral expertise before 
we “take the next plane to the scene of the current crisis, run for Congress, buy a 
newspaper plant, go among the poor, or set up a soap box” (2000:192). Robert S. Lynd 
was concerned with the moral dilemma of the social scientist who found himself caught 
between the perceived need for moral interventionism and a sociology that was not to be 
subversive (1939:7).  
At the other end of the continuum, there were those who questioned a sociology that 
adopted this moral duty. Irving Horowitz criticized what he saw as a sociology enmeshed 
in the “politics of advocacy and the ideology of self-righteousness.” He argued that 
sociology had largely become a repository of discontent and a gathering of special 
agendas. Instead of a study of ideology, sociology was now an ideology itself (1993:2-23).  
There were also questions about the ethics of a sociology which used its scientistic 
rationale to validate moral interventionism; the immoral position of claiming scientific 
integrity in order to serve their constituency’s programs. Alvin Gouldner argued that the 
positivist social scientist was, knowingly or unknowingly, a propaganda instrument for 
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the status quo.1  “Truth” and “scientific objectivity” are not things to be “packaged for the 
tastes and services of ‘important’ denizens of the worlds of commerce and politics” (Lee 
1976:925). There was also a complaint that whatever “truth” our research might warrant, 
there are those for whom the social and political consequences of results determined 
whether they would accept them (Lieberson 1992). 
In addition to critiques of our “moralistic identity” there was a second focus on what was 
seen as a problem of “scientism” in our methodology which led to a paucity of research 
results. Robert A. Scott argued that our research results were inconsequential. Alan 
Wolfe is even harsher in his analysis. He criticizes what he sees as the “sheer amount of 
work that lacks interest and serves no political cause whatsoever” (1994:86). It was 
claimed that policy makers generally used our research to match plausible rationales and 
chunks of evidence to conclusions that had already been reached, or to reduce disquieting 
complexity and uncertainty to reassuring simplicities (MacInnes 2004:543). 
There were different reasons given for the weaknesses of our research. Some criticized 
our excessive use of jargon and sham scientific slang; pretentious mathematical notation; 
the slavish imitation of the physical sciences; platitudes passed off as significant 
discoveries; and undue emphasis on predictive statements (Sorokin 1976). Feagin and 
Hernan Vera claim that our attachment to an instrumental positivism led to knowledge 
that was fragmented, divorced from its historical and social context, and therefore of less 
use to critical theory and praxis.  
__________________ 
1 Jacques Ellul argued that the essential task of propaganda is to reproduce “innocence 
from generation to generation (in both meanings of the word: ignorance and non-moral 
culpability)” Ellul, Jacques. 1965. Propaganda (Vintage). Vintage. 
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Many argued that the paucity of meaningful research findings is the result of our 
methodology’s inability to recognize the “enormous complexity of social life” (Phillips 
1971: xix). Scott noted the inability of detached empiricism to say anything meaningful 
about the complexity of social interactions (1979:12). Feagin and Vera also raise the 
issues of the complexity of our subject of study and the inadequacy of simple linear 
statistical mathematics and detached empiricist methods (2001:32).   
There are many more works I could add to this list. Some express a general concern 
about the state of sociology (Berger 1992; Berger and Huntington 2002). Others point to 
our lack of cumulative results (Gans 1992). There is criticism of our continued practice of 
a barren positivist methodology (Bleicher 1982; Francis 1983; Gamberg 1969; Porter 
2004; Shapiro 2005).  
In summary, the crisis thinkers criticize the morality of our behavior and the strength of 
our warrants. My claim is that these are all valid criticisms and that they point to 
problems that can benefit from an investigation of the philosophical commitments that lie 
beneath our discipline.  
Clarifications 
This paper has a limited scope of subjects and claims. First, I will not address qualitative 
or interpretive approaches. Second, I do not claim that sociology should disengage from 
all humanitarian projects tomorrow. My claim is that an appropriate reflection on our 
metaethics raises questions and offers new visions of our moral and ethical 
responsibilities. Third, I do not suggest that we should completely abandon our traditional 
quantitative methodology in the social sciences. A reflection on our ontology and 
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epistemology will lead to a consideration of the advantages of the introduction of 
additional components into our suite of traditional quantitative methods.  
On another point, Durkheim was selected from the usual suspects (those whom we call 
the classical theorists) not because he should be seen as the primary villain, but a number 
of other reasons. There is the issue of scope. If, say, Tarde and Simmel were added the 
paper would extend beyond the reader’s patience. To paraphrase Marvell, “Had we but 
world enough and time, these extra theorists were no crime.” I also chose Durkheim 
because of his early success in institutionalization and his widespread influence on the 
evolution of sociology. His reach, in his own time, was significant. He was the first to 
establish sociology as a departmental science in the academy and as the primary source of 
expertise in government policy. In many ways, his approach helps us to understand the 
path of institutionalization in American sociology.  
However, the primary reason Durkheim was chosen was because he provided the first 
clear articulation of first principles which underwrote modern sociology. It is difficult to 
track this development in early American sociology because the process of 
institutionalization in America did not begin with one clear leader or even one widely 
accepted theoretical foundation.  
Plan of the dissertation 
The second chapter establishes the concepts of philosophical foundations as they will be 
used in this paper and argues for the value of a deeper reflection on our commitments to 
first principles. These commitments are to foundational beliefs about how the world is, 
what right action is, and how we know. In this regard, we make commitments to first 
 7 
principles in ontology, metaethics, and epistemology. Mitch Rose argues that, as social 
scientists, we are inextricably intertwined with metaphysics and that we should simply 
accept the responsibility of a more adequate self-reflection in our primitive ontological 
beliefs (2004:462).  
William Connolly, noting that we may not want to “get technical,” characterizes these 
commitments as our "existential faith," a term he offers in case we react unfavorably to 
the cold term "metaphysic".2 In this case, I do want to take us a little deeper into the 
“technical” in order to explore the dynamism of the interrelationships of first principles in 
these three areas (Williams 2005:2-3).  
Some argue that an examination of such first principles is not within the purview of 
sociology. Our brief does not include the philosophical investigation of ontology or 
epistemology as subjects in themselves. We are not expected to adjudicate between 
opposing philosophical positions in foundational ontological and epistemological debates. 
“Insofar as it is not clear how these controversies will turn out, sociological theories 
should be cautious and not commit themselves to one or another view” (Abend 2008:195). 
However, we have already committed ourselves to a view. How else could we organize 
our theory and practice?  
While the advancement of the more specialized discourses in the discipline of philosophy 
__________________ 
2 “An existential faith is a hot, committed view of the world layered into the affective 
dispositions, habits and institutional priorities of its confessors. The intensity of 
commitment to it typically exceeds the power of the arguments and evidence advanced” 
Connolly, William. 2004. "Method, Problem, Faith." Pp. 332-49 in Problems and 
Methods in the Study of Politics, edited by I. Shapiro, R. M. Smith, and T. E. Masoud. 
Cambridge University Press. 
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is not part of our portfolio, it does behoove us to examine our own assumptions and 
beliefs in these areas. A slightly more technical grasp of the discourse and its major 
debates makes for informed choices on our part and a more fruitful scrutiny of our 
foundational beliefs. 
For example, an understanding of the pros and cons of the different theories of warrants 
and justification puts our own epistemological claims on more solid ground. An 
examination of development of different principles of causation, their virtues and 
weaknesses as warrants, and the criticisms against each, informs our claims for the truth 
and certainty of our research results. An understanding of foundational notions of 
metaethics help us consider our commitment to a particular normative ethics and helps us 
defend our stance on moral activism.  
However, it is not only our commitments in each of the three areas, that call for a deeper 
reflection. There are also the problems and effects of a set of commitments that is 
internally inconsistent. These can lead to a practice of sociology that lacks reliability. If 
these commitments are to inauthentic notions of the social world, they lead to an invalid 
description of the state of affairs. Infelicitous fits weaken a theory’s descriptive, 
explanatory, and predictive powers.  
The third chapter investigates the scholarly career of Emile Durkheim, his commitment 
set, and how inconsistencies in these principles and their interrelations led to problems in 
his work. This chapter begins with an examination of the forces acting on the 
development of the first sociological institutions as departmental sciences and the 
interdependence of these forces with commitments to specific first principles. Emile 
Durkheim’s metaethical, ontological, and epistemological commitments are examined for 
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their strengths, weaknesses, and relationships to the demands of institutionalization in his 
time. 
Chapter 4 traces the genealogy of a moralistic identity and scientistic rationale in the 
context of the process of institutionalization of American sociology. It reviews how the 
Progressive Era influenced the moralistic identity of American sociology. There is also 
an examination of the long tradition of quantitative methodology in sociology and how 
the introduction of statistics contributed to our scientistic rationale. The underlying 
problems in our metaethical, ontological and epistemological commitments are explicated 
throughout this chapter. It is shown how these first principles contributed to the problems 
addressed by the crisis tradition. The chapter concludes with a discussion of potential 
new directions based on a different set of commitments. The focus here is on alternative 
ontological and epistemological commitments. The discussion of alternative metaethical 
commitments is taken up in chapter 7. 
The fifth chapter investigates the scholarly work of Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze began with a 
different problem than Durkheim. Deleuze was interested in what he saw as the failure of 
representation. He followed an alternate tradition in Western philosophy, one that ran 
through Heraclitus, the Stoics, Duns Scotus, Spinoza, Leibniz, Nietzsche, Whitehead, and 
Bergson. He developed a set of revisionary first principles which rejected representation 
and the One, offering instead an ontology of process and difference. His metaethics was 
built on the propositions of the stoics and Nietzsche’s amor fati. His epistemology 
employed a different interpretation of mereology and warrants. His constituency was 
made up of philosophers; only in his later work did he offer a practical approach to 
politics. The summary section of the chapter shows how Deleuze’s commitment set 
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supports the theory of complex social systems. 
Chapter 6 begins with a discussion of the mereology of the third wave of systems theory 
and its relationships to complexity studies. This leads to the introduction of the 
methodology of agent-based modeling along with a review of its problems, its benefits 
for the study of complex social systems, and its early applications in sociology and other 
social sciences. I claim that this methodology, once it is combined with our traditional 
quantitative practices, will provide a new suite of tools that is better suited to the 
complexity and mereological issues of social systems. I suggest that Deleuze’s 
philosophy offers a more viable set of first principles in support of complexity studies 
and third-wave systems theory in sociology. 
The concluding chapter revisits the problems that led to our crisis literature. It begins 
with a deeper look at the metaethical foundations of our moralistic identity and a 
consideration of the metaethics of Deleuze. Examples of arguments for a “just war” are 
used to explore how the positions of morality and principlism fare when called upon to 
warrant moral interventions. The warrants of ethics and particularism are then considered 
in the same context. There is an examination of Deleuze’s concepts of jurisprudence, 
minoritarian politics, and  deterritorialization. While any significant change to our moral 
identity faces resistance, an expansion of our metaethical discourse and possible changes 
to our curricula can help us examine our penchant for interventionism from a Deleuzean 
standpoint. There is a brief comment on the previous chapter’s examination of the effect 
a Deleuzean ontology and epistemology might have on the quantitative rationale for 
sociology. The paper concludes with a short coda.   
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CHAPTER 2 - METAPHYSICAL COMMITMENTS 
This chapter serves as a modest propaedeutic. The goal is to come to a shared 
understanding of particular aspects of the philosophical discourse of ontology, metaethics, 
and epistemology. The discussion will be limited to topics and debates that are critical to 
our investigation of the philosophical foundations of Durkheim and Deleuze. The focus is 
on the notions of social facts and social processes, transcendence and immanence in 
social theory, theoretical propositions regarding individualism and holism, the strength of 
moral judgments, the epistemological support for theoretical and practical sociological 
claims, and the relation between epistemic warrants and methodologies. Durkheim and 
Deleuze have very different approaches to these topics. Armed with a shared lexicon and 
understanding of these philosophical terms, issues and discourses, the philosophical 
foundations of the two theorists can be delineated.  
Metaphysics 
In the twentieth century it was common to talk about the end of metaphysics, which 
meant the abandonment of the transcendental in favor of the immanent. In one sense, 
metaphysics can be narrowly defined as the study of the relationship between the 
transcendent and the immanent (Smith 2009a:55-6). Or, metaphysics can be thought of as 
the study of all that is beyond experience. Hume famously denounced this form of 
metaphysics when he said that any text of metaphysics should “be committed to the 
flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion” (Hume and Hendel 1955:Bk. 
Xii, Pt. 3). Here, use of the term metaphysics is limited to the Oxford English Dictionary 
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definition: “the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things or 
reality.” This emphasis on first principles is basic to my argument throughout.   
Metaphysical commitments, commitments sets, and philosophical foundations all describe 
the sets of commitments we make to first principles. Our commitment set is the 
overarching structure and the interrelationships of these commitments. Our commitment 
set thus includes not only a separate order or set of concepts and ideas. It is rather the 
“genetic core of a philosophical system in its ongoing transformative relation to the 
worlds it draws up and that, in return, feed into it” (Williams 2005:2). A simple glossary 
clarifies how the terms will be used in this paper: 
Metaphysics: the study of first principles, our most basic beliefs and primitive tenets. In 
this case, we will look to first principles in ontology, metaethics, and epistemology. 
Ontology: the study of reality, what types of entities exist, problems of uniformity and 
regularity, universals and particulars, and mereology. 
Metaethics: the study of the logic of ethical discourse, the analysis of the nature of moral 
reasoning, and the meaning of moral terms. 
Epistemology: the study of how we know, the nature of knowledge as justified, true 
beliefs. Under this heading, principles of causation and methodology are also 
included.  
Philosophers have characterized metaphysics in different ways. Heidegger proposed 
special and general types of metaphysics. A general metaphysics concerns itself with 
being, and the most general ontological, metaethical, or epistemological concepts that can 
be predicated of any possible being. Special metaphysics, or regional metaphysics, deals 
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with the independent sciences. Thus biology examines the being of living organisms, 
theology focuses on the nature of God as the highest being, and so on (Smith 2009a:58-9). 
In the philosophy of sociology we focus on a special or regional commitment set of 
ontological, metaethical, and epistemological first principles concerning the social world. 
On another axis, P. F. Strawson made a distinction between descriptive and revisionary 
metaphysics. A descriptive metaphysics captures the deepest presuppositions of our 
current set of commitments to first principles, the “common sense” philosophy of the 
times. In revisionary metaphysics we advance a theory to replace our basilar language 
and doxastic thinking. The metaphysics of Durkheim was largely descriptive, while 
Deleuze was concerned with revisionary metaphysics.  
Ontology 
The Oxford English Dictionary distinguishes ontology as “the science or study of being; 
that branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature or essence of being or existence.” 
Our ontological commitment begins with what we take to be self-evident or prima facie 
propositions about ontological simples or primitives which cannot be further reduced. 
Thus the field of ontology seeks a category theory, an inventory of existents.  
It is common to speak of a philosopher’s ontology, meaning the kinds of things they take 
to exist, or the ontology of a theory, meaning the things that would have to exist for that 
theory to be true. Are there universals, or only particulars? Is there mind or spirit, or is 
there only matter? Our ontological commitment is to the set of beliefs, latent or well 
considered, we hold in these matters. 
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The disputes regarding the ontological status of representations is at the center of the 
differences between the first principles of Durkheim and Deleuze. Durkheim adopted the 
classical paradigm of Plato, that is, that the particular is a distorted representation of a 
universal Ideal. Durkheim privileges representations as our best gauge of the noumenal 
world. Deleuze, on the other hand, regards Western philosophy as a history of the failure 
of representation. When we consider representations and the noumenal we take up the 
study of reality, where it resides, and how it can be accessed. The most generally held 
answers to this topic are associated with the positions of realism, antirealism, and 
irrealism.  
Realists claim there is a suprasensible realm of objects and concepts that would continue 
to exist in a mind-denuded world. Naïve or commonsense realism holds that external 
things exist exactly as we know them; that we directly perceive the objects of the external 
world. Scientific realism, in addition to the ontological and epistemological postulates of 
realism, makes the methodological commitment to scientific research as the most 
advanced mode of inquiry into any matters of fact, holding that “scientific research can 
yield increasingly true representations of the world” (Bunge 1996:353, 356). 
Anti-realists hold that, whether or not the noumenal world exists, knowledge of these 
mind-independent objects is not possible. 3  Absent warranted beliefs regarding a 
transcendental realm, anti-realists hold that reality is mind-coordinated, that the mind 
spreads itself onto the external world. Berkeley held a form of antirealist belief that 
__________________ 
3 Irrealists go one step further and categorically deny the existence of an objective, 
independent world Goodman, Nelson. 1978. Ways of Worldmaking. Hackett Publishing 
Company. 
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things exist only when perceived. A limerick by Ronald Knox, with a reply, sets forth 
Berkeley’s theory of material objects (Russell 2009:648): 
 
There was a young man who said “God 
Must think it exceedingly odd 
If he finds that this tree  
Continues to be 




Dear sir:  
Your astonishment’s odd: 
I am always about in the Quad 
So that’s why the tree 
Will continue to be, 




We warrant a claim of reality, such as that of a particular tree, if it is the subject of a 
convergence of opinions. For example, if everyone, or most everyone, agrees that 
unicorns are real, then unicorns are real by agreement. An argument to objective reality 
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based on agreement can be defeated, in this case, by pointing out that, at some later date, 
most everyone agrees unicorns are not real.  
Before proceeding with this section it will be helpful to agree on the meanings of the 
terms general, universal, and necessary. In considering groups of uniform or like 
members, there is a distinction to be made between generality, universality, and necessity. 
We may hold that all swans are white but we can only claim that swans are generally 
white. The claim recognizes that we have yet to see all swans, now or in the future (just 
as we have, perhaps unfortunately, yet to see all social revolutions). If we hold that all 
swans are universally white, then we claim that there can be no contradictory instance. 
Yet the fact that all swans are universally white remains contingent. It might just as well 
have been that all swans are black. To argue that all swans are white by necessity, means 
that there could be no case of a non-white swan at any time in our world or any other. 
These concepts are used when we consider the problems of uniformity and regularity. 
Our quotidian world confronts us with what seem to be groups of uniform objects and 
regular causal relationships. How do we explain these patterns, and what lies beneath 
them? One answer to the problem of ontological uniformity can be a commitment to 
notions of types, as universals, categories, natural kinds, and so forth. The problem of 
regularity has produced various solutions, many of which propose general, universal, or 
necessary covering laws. 
We observe that certain particulars coalesce into sets, or groups of likes. Philosophers 
refer to this as attribute agreement (Loux 1997). This may reflect the power of ideal 
forms and the essential properties of particulars, or it may be the result of sinks or 
attractors in dynamic, contingent flows. The appearance of uniformity could also be the 
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result of the nature of our faculties of perception, a parsing reflex that disposes us to 
determinate judgments which assign things we perceive to a type.  
The problem of regularity addresses the regular repetition of relations, causal or 
otherwise, over time. However, laws of regularity require uniform entities. It is logically 
impossible to warrant a causal law if the variables lack unit homogeneity. Otherwise, 
“inductive reasoning, based on the belief that like things behave alike, would have no 
application” (Schlesinger 1990:529). When we observe some weak level of regularity at a 
gross level of processes, we must ask whether these regularities are “governing or simply 
phenomenal” (Cartwright 1983). Without proof of unit homogeneity in all instances of 
the covering law, we are unable to discern whether a regularity is the result of a law of 
nature, or merely accidental.4  
One way to explain uniformity in particulars is to utilize what is known as a philosophy 
of identity. This approach explains uniformity by an appeal to an ontology of enduring 
identities possessed of, or marked, by essential properties. Identity philosophers employ 
the notion of types (kinds, universals, or categories)5 which govern and taxonomize 
particulars. I use the word “type” here in its simplest meaning; “. . . the general form, 
structure, or character distinguishing a particular kind, group, or class of beings or objects” 
__________________ 
4 “Every massive body attracts every other massive body” expresses a law of nature. 
“Everyone in this room speaks English” is an accidental regularity. 
5 Kant proposed a stringent notion of a category but today the word “category” is used by 
philosophers for any supposedly ultimate type. Universals are a property or relation that 
can be instantiated in a particular, as each yellow thing instantiates the universal yellow 
which acts as a type.  
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(OED.) Types, then, are what stand behind groups of likes as opposed to an arbitrary 
group such as the contents of a trash can.  
A distinction is customarily drawn between qualitative and numerical identity or 
sameness. Things with qualitative identity share properties. Numerical identity requires 
absolute, or total, qualitative identity, and can only hold between a thing and itself 
(Geach 1973; Noonan 2011:2)  
The notion of identity underwritten by universal ideals has become part of the doxa of 
Western philosophy. For Plato, these universals are his ontological simples, his unmoved 
movers, primitive and irreducible, transcendent, and ante rem: before things. Particulars 
are authentic representations to the degree they reflect the essential property associated 
with the universal. However, particulars are impermanent and imperfect copies of the 
ideals because they were perverted by their accidental properties. There have been many 
critics of Plato’s essentialism. Bas van Fraasen, like Hume, claimed that we could have 
no knowledge of real essences. “Real essences are simply metaphysical baggage, science 
need only be concerned with observable entities” (1980:31). Others argue that the pursuit 
of certain knowledge of an ideal’s essential property is a fool’s errand. “. . . every term 
goes cloudy at its edges, . . . Every species waggles about in its definition, every tool is a 
little loose in its handle” (Wells 1904:386). 
Unlike Plato’s ideals, the nominalist argument holds that types are simply conventions 
based on human convenience, that universals are simply a form of linguistic expression 
with general applications. The Schoolmen claimed that when we award objects 
membership in a set of “like” things it is simply a matter of linguistic and perceptual 
convenience. These artifacts simply support the act of understanding itself. Roscelin 
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characterized these “universals” as flatus voci or simple vocalizations, with no real 
referent. Falstaff speaks to this point in Henry IV, Part 1, “What is honor? A word. What 
is that word honor? Air” (V.1.133-134).  
Philosophers of identity employ notions of essential properties and ideal forms to argue 
for the synchronic identity of entities. Plato put forward a distinction between essential 
and accidental properties. He distinguished between properties of a thing, or kind of thing, 
that are essential to it, and those that are merely accidents. Essentialists will argue that, 
among a set of essential properties, a person cannot exist without occupying space. A 
man can remove an accidental property, such as a hat, without ceasing to occupy space. 
But a man that ceases to occupy space has lost part of his essence. The debate regarding 
essentialism pivots on the claim that any essential properties points to a universal and 
immutable Idea, thus like entities all share at least one essential property which is 
numerically identical in each entity (see p. 18). 
Diachronic identity, or the persistence of identity over time, is a more difficult problem, 
one addressed by endurantism or perdurantism. Platonists support endurance theory, 
which holds that when a material object exists at different times, it is wholly present at 
those times. It has no temporal parts, but only spatial parts, which likewise are wholly 
present at the different times they exist – material objects endure (Loux 1997:230-255; 
Noonan 2011). The other alternative, perdurantism, offers support to philosophies of 
immanence and particularism. Perdurantists claim that a physically continuous individual 
which persists through time has distinct parts existing at each distinct time in its existence 
– material objects perdure. The perdurable entity is just an aggregate of timeslices.  
Philosophy of Difference 
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A philosophy of immanence, as opposed to identity, is a commitment to the unique, 
observable entity as all that is real. The commitment is to particulars as ontological 
simples and a rejection of representations as imitations of universals. It does not 
completely reject essentialism, but argues that each unique entity has a set of essential 
properties that do not exist in any other entity. Nominalists, proposed that we could 
recognize sets of likes without recourse to transcendental forms. They argued that these 
names of likes, such as “cats,” “mats,” “tables,” and “chairs,” are simply linguistic 
conveniences (see p. 20). These signifiers represent patterns of formations whose 
boundaries are essentially contested; it is impossible to set conditions for a membership 
based on a rigid set of properties. We group similar entities together based on what 
Wittgenstein called their family resemblance. 
like Duns Scotus, believed all existing things are “bare” particulars that do not have 
essential properties as Plato used the term. Imagine coldness as a typical property. In one 
reading the coldness of one block of ice is different from the coldness of another block of 
ice. This is not the simple degree of coldness, but two separate instances. This is called a 
property instance or a “trope” (Williams 1953). Thus a particular can be a bundle of 
unique tropes (Goodman 1951). Yet another alternative is to view each particular as 
having one simple essential property called a “haecceity.”6  Haecceitism is the view that 
simple individuals have individual essences, properties which are not only essential but 
__________________ 
6 The quality implied in the use of this, as this man; “thisness”; “hereness and nowness”; 
that quality or mode of being in virtue of which a thing is or becomes a definite 
individual; individuality – OED. 
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also unique to the objects which possess them. There is no numerical identity to 
haecceities, they can not be counted (see p. 18). 
Philosophers of difference, or immanence, often hold that the world is best understood in 
terms of relational processes rather than things — of modes of change rather than fixed 
stabilities. “What exists in nature is not just originated and sustained by processes but is 
in fact ongoingly and inexorably characterized by them” (Rescher 2009). Clearly, storms 
and heat-waves are every bit as real as tables and mats. The focus moves from enduring 
identities to perduring processes as the ontological simple or primitive. The shift from 
identity to relational processes requires a revisionary metaphysics.  
The key question confronting sociologists in the present day is not “material 
versus ideal,” “structure versus agency,” “individual versus society,” or any of the 
other dualisms so often noted; rather, it is the choice between substantialism and 
relationalism (Emirbayer 1997:281). 
Mereology, a subfield of ontology, is the study of the relationships between parts and 
wholes. Our mereological commitment is a set of beliefs regarding the characteristics of 
the two levels and their interactions. Mereology asks whether a level exhibits causal, 
ontological, or explanatory independence. The major approaches to the problems of 
mereology are reductionism and emergentism. (I expand on these concepts and their 
implications for complex systems in chapter 6.) 
Reductionists claim that properties of a whole are completely determined by the 
properties and relations of its proper parts. Thus no matter how complex an object may be, 
the assembling of indistinguishable parts in numerically identical relationships will 
produce an exact duplicate upper level property. Reductionism relies on the same claims 
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of unit homogeneity and simple causal relationships that were required for subsumptive 
laws.  
One of the most powerful attacks on reductionism is based on the Duhem-Quine thesis, 
which claims that domain A is reducible to domain B, if and only if there is a direct and 
unique connection between each member of A to a single member of B. Thus 
reductionism can be defeated by the multiple realization argument (Heil 1999:189). The 
claim is that systems with the same functional state or causal effectiveness, for example 
“acting as a church,” may be multiply realized by a wide range of independent variables.7  
Ontological, or strong, emergence holds that emergent properties are ontologically and 
causally independent (Kim 1999:33; Vrba 1989:7). There is a strong link between 
ontological emergence, complexity studies, and chaos theories. Strong emergence 
necessarily produces complex open systems which are inherently unpredictable, even 
given full knowledge of the constituents of the system (Newman 1996:247).  
Metaethics 
Metaethics is the study of the study of the logic of ethical discourse, the analysis of the 
nature and warrants of moral judgments. Metaethics does not address normative ethics 
(for example, deontology or utilitarianism) nor applied ethics (environmental or medical 
ethics). Metaethics investigates the notion of basic moral principles, primitive 
__________________ 
7 In this example, they could include a variety of organizational structures, cultural 
practices, interactional patterns, and individual beliefs and dispositions. Thus “acting as a 
church” could be realized in one token instance by one set of independent variables and 
realized on another occasion by a radically different set. In other words, similar effects 
can be realized by wildly disjunctive component sets Fodor, Jerry A. 1974. "Special 
Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)." Synthese 28:97-115. 
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propositions of moral laws or ethical behavior, and the sources of authority for these 
claims. It includes the study of moral realism, moral judgments, moral expertise, moral 
duty, the nature of ethical behavior, and similar matters.  
Debates about realism, antirealism, and irrealism are most prominent now in moral theory. 
For example, moral realists hold that the proposition or moral judgment “gratuitous 
cruelty is wrong” exists as a real and necessary law whether or not it is generally held in 
any given social group at this time (Sayre-McCord 1988). Antirealists hold that the proof 
of such a real, independent law, residing in some transcendental realm (should one exist), 
is inaccessible (Ayer 1953). Irrealists hold that there is no objective, independent real 
world to access. Rather there are multiple “world-versions”, which are useful in different 
circumstances (Goodman 1978). Antirealists and irrealists may support the “Boo/Hurray” 
metaethical theory in which a “true” moral judgment is simply “warranted” by a personal 
expression of emotional support or preference.  
Moral relativism claims that the truth of moral judgments is relative to the conventions of 
the social group, and that these conventions are not themselves subject to any further 
criterion of adequacy. In this view, there are no rational constraints on what can count as 
moral values. However the abandonment of moral realism “in no way requires the 
adoption of private, solipsistic signalling into the void” (Chaloupka 1990:350). Moral 
Pluralism argues that moral values, norms, ideals, duties and virtues are diverse, but not 
infinite (Berlin 1968; Gowans 1994).  
Metaethics explores the nature of moral judgments as evaluative claims concerning the 
viability of specific moral laws or ethical behavior. This implies an ability to warrant 
moral propositions as true through a process of epistemic justification. A key point in this 
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debate is whether or not moral judgments are truth-apt, that is, they can be warranted by 
some method and measured against a particular truth theory. Generally truth-aptness 
implies a truth theory and warrants of correspondence to some real state of affairs. Moral 
realism claims that moral laws are supported by reality, or what is the case, and thus 
moral judgments are truth-apt. Anti-realism in metaethics holds that moral precepts are 
not truth-apt, that they do not have the support of universal moral laws as eternal ideas in 
the mind of God, and thus can not be warranted as true, as corresponding to what is the 
case. 
If moral judgments are truth-apt and warranted by transcendent moral laws, the moral 
realists can claim that one can have expert knowledge of a moral or ethical state of affairs. 
Moral expertise involves more than merely knowing what moral views are prevalent 
within a profession or a society. Social scientists who gather statistical data on the moral 
judgments of a collective are census experts, not moral experts in the sense of metaethics. 
Moral experts are sometimes defined as those who have studied moral questions carefully, 
know the main theories developed in response to such questions, and are able to offer 
arguments that would convince reasonable people.  
If one makes metaethical commitments to moral realism and moral expertise, it is but a 
short step to a commitment to moral duty, a duty to set the world right (Bennett 2002a; 
Bennett 2002b; Bennett 1984; Chaloupka 2002; Curthoys 2002). Consider these 
propositions: 
P1 Certain social and physical conditions are morally imperative. 
P2 It is our moral duty to act to restrict attempts to harm these conditions. 
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P3 It is our moral duty to act to convert others to believe P1 and P2. 
P4 The nonhuman world is morally considerable. 
It seems to me that P2 may easily follow from P1 and, further, that the pair are easily 
warranted on the basis of a deontological ethics that prescribes actions that respect the 
rights of others (Cafaro 2001). If a moral realist held that P4 is a truth-apt example of a 
P1, then moral duty toward the environment and flora and fauna could be supported if P1 
through P3 are held to be binding. However, it is not clear to me that the move from P2 to 
P3 is warranted by any ethical theory. A moral anti-realist or moral relativist would 
consider the jump to P3 as the vice of moralism or cultural chauvinism. Even a moral 
realist could ethically decline P3. In the terms of virtue ethics, “a reluctance to move 
from spirited dialogue to an ardent, passionate, or zealous engagement in a moral cause is 
a virtue” (Bennett 2002a). More on this will be found in the concluding chapter. 
Epistemology8 
Epistemology is concerned with how we know and the nature of knowledge as justified, 
true beliefs. It investigates different methods of warranting beliefs as true. True beliefs by 
themselves do not qualify as knowledge but require reliable justification (Alston 1963; 
Pollock 1987). Knowledge claims can be justified through intuition, direct observation, 
reliable testimony, reflective equilibrium, and other methods. Each method in a coherent 
__________________ 
8 As an aside, when we talk about the epistemological commitments of a sociological 
theory this is very different from the recent school of social epistemology. Social 
epistemology is an empirical science that investigates the social constraints imposed on 
the pursuit of knowledge claims. It is interested in explaining the origins and warrants of 
certain beliefs or values concerning the knowledge process, such as the belief that science 
is objective Schmaus, Warren. 1991. "Social Epistemology - Fuller, S." Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences 21(1):121-125. 
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epistemological commitment aligns with a theory of truth that provides the most 
felicitous fit. For example, the scientific method of warranting truth claims is associated 
with the correspondence theory of truth. This theory holds that we can warrant a 
statement to be true if it corresponds to some state of affairs in the real world.  
Foundationalism simply posits fundamental beliefs as indisputably true, without 
themselves needing support; the unproved provers. We accept them as prima facie or 
intuitive. Wittgenstein commented that no matter how deeply he followed his reason, 
there is a point at which he reached “bedrock, and my spade is turned” (1949:486). 
Secondary beliefs thus act as axioms, relying on these foundational beliefs for their 
justification.  The coherentist theory of truth argues that all beliefs are justified to the 
extent that they stand in relationships of mutual support. Thus every belief is as least 
partly justified by its fit with other accepted beliefs. However, these warrants lead to 
knowledge claims that may be corrigible, open to empirical refutations, or a change in 
doxa. 
There are propositions which we hold to be true although we can not prove them. 
Problems of religion and the mathematics of prime numbers come to mind. Knowledge 
claims gain epistemic power to the extent we are able to explain them or define their 
causal relationships. This is a widely accepted axiom of the scientific method. Thus one’s 
commitment to a particular principle of causation is an important component of her 
epistemology and methodology.  
We often invoke a deductive-nomological logic, the “covering law” model. We claim that 
we explain something when an event is subsumed under a causal law, “if x, then y, 
always”. That is, its occurrence is deducible from the law and a set of initial conditions. 
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Sociology’s linear principle of causation is based on this logic, on a nomothetic approach 
that is concerned with establishing and applying covering laws. Anthropology, for 
example, relies more on an idiographic approach, that is, explanation by recourse to 
individual matters of fact. 
Many principles of causation have been proposed. Aristotle proposed four types of causal 
relationships. Consider a table. The material cause is the wood; the formal cause is the 
ideal form of table; the carpenter is the efficient cause; the teleological or final cause is 
the future and final purpose of the table. Followers of Hume claimed that causality must 
be ascertained by regular associations between putative causes and effects. Mill had a 
different opinion of causality. He recognized that there are causal laws, but held that they 
are “tendency” laws; they tell what the cause “tends to do” but not what actually occurs 
in any complex causal situation. While it is widely held that correlation is not causality, 
the social sciences generally award explanatory power to correlation coefficients. There 
is also the problem of recognizing the difference between governing and accidental 
regularities. 
There is an additional parameter to a principle of causation that was developed by the 
Scholastics in what they called the “divine names” problem. Broadly speaking, medieval 
philosophy distinguished between three types of causes: a transitive cause, an emanative 
cause, and an immanent cause. A transitive cause is a cause that leaves itself in order to 
produce, and what it produces is outside of itself. Christianity held to the idea of a real 
distinction between God and the world: if God created the world, and the world is 
exterior to God, then God must come out of himself in order to create the world; it 
therefore needed to see God as a purely transitive cause. An emanative cause, by contrast, 
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is a cause whose effect is exterior to it, but which nonetheless remains within itself in 
order to produce its effect. The sun, for example, remains within itself in order to produce, 
but what it produces (light) comes out of it. An immanent cause, finally, is a cause that 
not only remains within itself in order to produce, but one whose produced effect also 
remains within it. This is the conception of causality developed by Spinoza and we will 
see its utilization in Deleuze’s principle of causation. 
The commitments we make to specific principles of causation and epistemic justification 
inform the practical applications of methodology. Methodology is most effective when it 
coheres with one’s full set of first principles. “The appropriateness of a given set of 
methods turns on the assumptions about the nature of the causal relations they are meant 
to discover” (Hall 2003:374). If there is a dissonance between other commitments in 
one’s philosophical foundations, methods can be rendered dysfunctional. An ontological 
commitment to linear mechanistic causation and realism is logically coherent with a 
commitment to the scientific method and the logic of covering laws. On the other hand, it 
might be the case that the social world is a collection of open dynamic systems with 
chaotic, discontinuous processes. If this were so, then commitments to an ontology of 
identity, enduring stable entities, a linear principle of causation, and a methodology 
focused on radical decontextualization, would produce misaligned warrants and trivial 
and meager results.  
Conclusion 
Theories are built on metaphysical structures composed of ontological, epistemological, 
and metaethical commitments. There is a sequence of dependencies that determine the 
internal coherence of first principles.  
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Metaphysics guides tacit epistemology, that is, beliefs about what is important to 
know and how knowledge can be obtained … tacit epistemology in turn dictates 
the cognitive procedure [method] that people use for solving particular problems 
(Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan 2001:291-2, 306). 
The coherence and authenticity of these sets of commitments determine the limits and 
viability of a theory’s descriptive, explanatory, and predictive powers. Internal coherence 
is achieved when commitments fit, one to another, in a felicitous manner. Metaphysical 
structures that are logically inconsistent are self-contradictory; upon analysis they sound 
Nietzsche’s “hollow tone” (1997:3).  External validity is achieved when a set of 
commitments provides an authentic view of the external state of affairs, of what is the 
case.  
Chapters 3 and 5 describe the philosophies of Emile Durkheim and Gilles Deleuze, 
respectively. They look to each theorist’s situation and the problem he chose to address. 
They examine each scholar’s philosophical infrastructure and his respective 
commitments to first principles in ontology, metaethics and epistemology, and investigate 
the logical relationships between levels of commitments. Certain relations will be shown 
to be infelicitous if not illogical. These “grindings” of articulations had significant effects 
on either theory’s ability to gain an institutional status. 
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CHAPTER 3 - THE PHILOSOPHICAL COMMITMENTS OF EMILE DURKHEIM 
Unfortunately, Durkheim’s body of work has not produced one clear and authoritative 
interpretation. Some claim Durkheim’s project was the search for the source of the moral. 
Others, that “ . . . all of Durkheim’s work reflects his attempt to account for both the 
emergence of the social from the individual and downward causation from the social to 
the individual” (Sawyer 2005). Yet another perspective claims “ . . . basically, Durkheim 
was interested in the many aspects of a single problem: to set epistemology on a scientific 
basis” (Bohannon 1960:80). Lukes claims that “Durkheim's central interest was in the 
ways in which social and cultural factors influence, indeed largely constitute, individuals” 
(1982:13). Many scholars see the central influence on all of his work as the desire to 
establish sociology as an institution. It is this last reading that I will use to examine the 
development, content, and internal coherence of his metaphysical commitments. 
This chapter begins with a look into how departmental sciences achieved institutional 
status. There is a review of Durkheim’s historical situation and his path through the 
institutionalization process. The Rules of Sociological Method (Durkheim 1982[1895]) 
(hereafter Rules), including the important Preface to the Second Edition (Durkheim 
1982[1901]), can be seen as a response to the requirements of the process. It also reflects 
Durkheim’s first principles in philosophy. This chapter concludes with an analysis of his 
metaethical, ontological, and epistemological positions, and their internal fit. 
The establishment of academic disciplines 
Each field or school of thought or discipline reflects its metaphysical commitments. This 
is the set of first principles that drives normative stances and methodologies. These 
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commitments stand prior to specific theories, and can remain virtually impervious to 
refutation. Disciplines gain institutional status by generating a dominant discourse which 
is a response to particular intellectual and political contexts (Burke III 1984:649). The 
study of crises in authority shows us how certain discourses, such as sociology, are 
selected and institutionalized (Burke III 1984:654). 
The disciplines of the social sciences were born during a time of crises. The Reformation 
and Counter-Reformation in Europe, and the Progressive Era in America, both created 
crises of moral authority. Thoreau captured the tenor of the crisis of moral authority when 
he wrote, “despite Christianity and candles, we sit in the dark.” French anticlericalism 
preferred a new authority for policy making and moral education (Vidich and Lyman 
1985:2-3).  
This new moral authority had to be underwritten by scientific warrants as opposed to a 
reliance on divine authority. 19th-century thinkers, such as Comte, had proposed the idea 
of a social science that would be organized around the concepts of the natural sciences 
(Giddens 1976:727). The early social sciences were certain that social processes were 
available to scientific study. The knowledge of the social was imagined as accessible to 
explanations by way of subsumption under covering laws (Fararo 1987; Turner 2003:21-
22). It was thought that the process of institutionalization of new academic sciences 
would establish and warrant this moral authority. 
Components of academic disciplines 
The institutionalization of sociology in the French and American academies involved 
intellectual, organizational, and socio-cultural requirements. Candidates for 
institutionalization began with an innovation and were then required to a) develop a 
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theory with a distinct subject matter and a research exemplar, b) assemble an auxiliary of 
scholars with a shared commitment to the candidate’s theory, and c) attract a constituency 
with significant resources (Geiger 1975; Oberschall 1972). In both France and America, 
sociology emerged as a departmental science because it was able to respond to their 
constituency’s sense of the most critical needs of the time. In both countries, these needs 
were the same; development of scientific proof for social policies, and rational, if not 
empirical, support for moral governance. 
In France at the turn of the last century there were several “clusters of researchers” that 
all sought to establish the new science of sociology as an academic and research 
institution, or field (Clark 1968b). Many were unsuccessful. The Le Playists lacked a 
coherent and tightly shared intellectual concept of “sociology.” The social statisticians 
never developed professional status, or academic acceptance (Clark 1968b:37; 
Desrosières 1998). Rene Worms was only partially successful in his bid to attract and 
maintain a vital auxiliary of scholars dedicated to a shared theory (Clark 1968b). Gabriel 
Tarde had an aversion to an auxiliary of scholars rehearsing static axioms. Thus he did 
not offer certainty to a constituency who sought scientific legitimization of its policy 
agenda (Jones and Roffe 2009; Latour 2005; Tarde 1899).9  
__________________ 
9 Ironically there are aspects of Tarde’s work, and Simmel’s, that align with the alternate 
tradition of philosophy taken up by Deleuze Cederman, Lars-Erik. 2005. "Computational 
Models of Social Forms: Advancing Generative Process Theory." American Journal Of 
Sociology 110(4):864-893, Alliez, Eric. 2009. "Gabriel Tarde." Pp. 209-218 in Deleuze's 
Philosophical Lineage, edited by A. Jones and R. Joffee. Edinburgh University Press, 
Deleuze, Gilles. 1994[1968]. Difference and Repetition. Columbia University Press. 
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In contrast to these other pretenders to the throne, Durkheim achieved success as the 
result of his emphasis on creating a discipline. He recognized that in order to guarantee 
that his intellectual model did not become a “ . . . dead letter . . . it had to be made the 
basis of an entire discipline. . . . It was to establish that discipline that we have devoted 
our work” (Durkheim 1982[1895]:161). Durkheim alone was able to fulfill the 
intellectual, organizational, and political conditions necessary to institutionalize 
sociology as an academic discipline (Geiger 1975:237-238).  
The foundational intellectual component was established in three steps. First, he had to 
distinguish a unique subject of sociology. Second, his new department had to establish 
that the object of his discipline could be studied by the same scientific methods that 
legitimized other sciences. Third, he had to produce a Kuhnian exemplar, a pilot study 
which would serve as a model for all future studies that used his theory and methodology.  
The first practical order of business was to establish a unique subject (Collins 2005:106). 
“For sociology to be possible it must above all have an object all of its own – a reality 
which is not in the domain of the other sciences” (Durkheim 1951[1897]:38). He needed 
an object that claimed its own level of reality; “a space in reality of a science yet to come 
into being, a vacant space awaiting its science” (Hirst 1975:81).  
His unique subject matter had to be an “order of facts which other sciences do not study” 
(Durkheim 1982[1895]:162). In Rules he claimed he had found a subject all his own; the 
sui generis social fact. 10  “We have therefore succeeded in delineating for ourselves the 
__________________ 
10 Although Durkheim’s references to these concepts were varied and ambiguous in his 
work, this paper will use the following definitions. Social facts will refer to material and 
immaterial phenomena. Material social facts will be referred to as institutions; immaterial 
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exact field of sociology. It embraces one single, well defined group of phenomena” 
(1982[1895]:56). 
He carefully distanced his nascent sociology from psychology and philosophy throughout 
Rules (1982[1901]:38-43). For example, “In no way can sociology borrow purely and 
simply from psychology this or that proposition” (1982[1901]:42). His definition of a 
social fact “ . . . was intended to mark out the field of research as clearly as possible, and 
not for philosophy and sociology to embrace each other in some kind of comprehensive 
intuition” (1982[1901]:43).  
The second aspect of the intellectual component required that sociology’s unique subject 
be available to the scientific method. For a new field seeking academic legitimacy, the 
lack of scientific method made it a non-starter. This included a commitment to a 
deductive-nomological logic. 
As the sociologist penetrates into the social world, he must feel himself in the 
presence of facts governed by laws as unsuspected as those of life before the 
science of biology was evolved (1982[1901]:37). 
The third component of the intellectual requirement for institutionalization was the 
existence of an exemplar, a “common master scheme that could integrate the individual 
disciplines comprising the social sciences” (Clark 1968a:78). Rules became this  basic 
guide for individual specialists. Suicide: a study in sociology acted as both a locus 
classicus and, after a fashion, a proof text for the legitimacy of the analytic statistical 
                                                                                                                                            
social facts as collective representations. Collective representations are instances of 
individual beliefs which make up the collective consciousness. Individual representations 
are individual facts whose relationship to collective representations are never completely 
defined by Durkheim. 
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method in social research as espoused in Rules (Lemert 2003). At the time, this study was 
thought to provide a clear application of his proposed method from Rules. It was 
expected to serve as the model of future studies by Durkheim and his auxiliary of 
scholars,  and the model was oft replicated in his journal.  
After the first requirement for intellectual components was met, candidates had to 
develop the second component to meet the organizational requirements for 
institutionalization. This included an auxiliary of scholars and a research institute and 
journal which enabled recruitment, training, social integration, and the exercise and 
legitimization of authority (Clark 1968a). In this process,  amateurs were replaced with 
professionals, advanced specialized vocabularies were developed, and boundaries were 
established and maintained (Clark 1968b). The organization validated the expertise of its 
members through its control of specialized training. “The sense of the specific nature of 
social reality is even so essential to the sociologist that only a purely sociological culture 
can prepare him for the understanding of social facts” (Durkheim 1982[1895]:162).  
However important the intellectual and organizational requirements were, the sine qua 
non for institutionalization was a metaparadigm’s ability to attract a substantive 
constituency, that is, a clientele who use your services because “you and others belonging 
to your guild are certified experts” (Said 2002:175). An academic science is expected to 
provide “an assortment of facts . . . or predictions with regard to social reality that a 
constituency finds of sufficient value” (Geiger 1975:237). 
Durkheim understood, and genuinely shared, the interests of the patrons of his time. He 
saw that the timing was right for the development of the discipline of sociology. It was a 
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period of educational reform that favored that discipline which could generate the most 
programmatic enthusiasm in the intellectual politics of the time (Collins 2005:103).  
This educational reform movement was at bottom a project of moral reform. Durkheim 
was intent upon offering a course of moral guidelines discovered through the scientific 
study of the social; a science of morality (Schoenfeld 1991:79). As one outcome of his 
success with this patronage, Durkheim’s school was awarded not only legitimization as a 
source of policy, but also the control and guidance of the moral education of the nation’s 
students. 
Many of the claims in Rules were direct responses to the three requirements of 
institutionalization. His set of metaphysical commitments was strongly influenced by 
ideologies he shared with his constituency. Although Durkheim wanted to deny it, Rules 
was through and through, a collection of philosophical claims; claims of ontology and 
mereology, metaethics and morals, and epistemology and causation. In order to gain a 
constituency he began with metaethics. In order to gain the status of a science, he moved 
next to epistemology. In order to sustain his claims in these two areas, he developed an 
ontology. As we will see, problems in his metaethical propositions were magnified as he 
moved through this order of first principles. 
Metaethics 
In a period of moral reform, Durkheim adopted a set of metaethical commitments to 
moral realism and transcendent moral codes, truth-apt moral judgments, moral expertise, 
and a binding moral duty (Varga 2006). Durkheim made a case for moral governance 
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based on the “moral supremacy that society exerts over its members,” for social facts are 
like “moulds into which we are forced to cast our actions” (1982[1895]:70).  
In Chapter III of Rules, Durkheim claims that the normal and the pathological can be 
objectively studied and that they will thus produce a moral realism of objective laws. He 
begins by suggesting that a healthy organism is one that is most ethologically capable; it 
is better suited to adapt to different aspects of its environment. He makes the assumption 
that a Darwinian model of survival will produce a final utopian and stable taxonomy of 
types, and that the blind variation, so important to rhizomatic evolution, is objectively 
wrong. From there he proposes that “Those facts which appear in the most common 
forms we shall call normal, and the rest morbid or pathological” (1982[1895]:91). In 
Rules, Durkheim claims that sociology’s unique contribution and capacity is the ability to  
document the norm, and then valorize it. “We need only to work steadily and persistently 
to maintain the normal state” (1982[1895]:104).  
With this move, sociology becomes a study of morality. Sociology proceeds from 
a problem of the moral health of a society. . . . and takes on a moral 
instrumentalism (Hirst 1975:111). 
“Durkheim's whole program for ethics was to ground it on an empirical and relativistic 
basis” (Hinkle 1960:281; Levine 1973:429). His analysis seems to imply that a study of 
“what is” can divulge “what ought to be.” There were claims that empirical studies of 
religious codes in “developing” cultures would uncover traces of universal and necessary 
moral laws.  
But only certain individuals, those who underwent rigorous training in the science of 
sociology, could uncover these laws and provide moral expertise. Once certified, these 
experts would know what was abnormal or pathological and be able to prescribe the 
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correct moral policies and education as suitable constraints. “Only that constraint which 
corresponds to some social superiority, intellectual or moral, merits that designation” 
(Durkheim 1982[1895]:146).  
However, once this moral expertise is established it can easily lead to “ . . . a moral 
imperative for anyone who wished to educate individuals and engineer societies” 
(Challenger 1994:152). It is "absolutely necessary that there be an authority whose 
superiority they [the mass of men] acknowledge and which tells them what is right” 
(Durkheim 1958[1898]:200). This requires a moral authority that  “ . . . constrains us and 
to which we defer with a feeling of religious respect” (Durkheim 2002:92-93). He 
proposes that sociologists, as moral experts, take on the alb.  
All of this led to a belief that sociology had a duty to scientifically warrant a curriculum 
for moral education (Durkheim 1979[1917]). Fortunately, this curriculum would not be a 
hard sell. In order “ . . . to induce the individual to submit to it absolutely of his own free 
will, there is no need to resort to deception. It is sufficient to make him aware of his 
natural state of dependence and inferiority” (Durkheim 1982[1895]:143). 
Epistemology 
Having established moral realism, moral expertise, and moral duty, Durkheim’s next task 
was to establish an epistemology and scientific methodology that could warrant, describe, 
and explain moral facts. Durkheim adopted an epistemology of empiricism, a scientific 
method, a truth of correspondence, a simplistic one-to-one causal relationship, and a 
deductive-nomological logic of covering laws (see p. 26). 
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Durkheim’s principle of causation served as his primary warrant for truth claims and 
explanation (Lukes 1982:7). “Sociological explanation consists excusively in establishing 
relationships of causality” (Durkheim 1982[1895]:147). He claimed that by describing 
causality through his comparative method we had “explained” and warranted knowledge 
claims about social laws. “As soon as we have proved that in a certain number of cases 
two phenomena vary with each other, we may be certain that we are confronted with a 
law” (Durkheim 1982[1895]:153). However, the concept of causation is an 
epistemological assumption, a matter of imputation and not of observation (Hinkle 
1960:283). 
Durkheim refuted Mill’s principle of causality, which held that the same consequence 
does not always result from the same antecedent. Durkheim argues that Mill’s 
“conception of the causal link, by removing from it all determining power, renders it 
almost inaccessible to scientific analysis, for it introduces such complications into the 
tangle of causes and effects that the mind is irredeemably confused” (1982[1895]:148). 
Since his sociology would fail if this were true, it must not be. To “ . . . allow that the 
same phenomena can be due first to one cause and then to another . . . is to deny the 
principle of causality” (1982[1895]:79). He argued that if sociology were practiced in this 
spirit, “ . . . we shall collect together a considerable number of facts to no avail, because 
we shall never be able to obtain precise laws or clear-cut relationships of causality” 
(1982[1895]:149-150). Durkheim’s claim was clearly refuted by the argument from 
multiple realizability. 
His principle of simple one-to-one causation presented two serious problems for his 
epistemology. The first was mereological, covered in this section; the second ontological, 
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covered in the next. The mereological problem had two parts. First there was the problem 
of causation across two different ontological realms of moral facts and individuals. His 
ontological commitment to social facts as sui generis, necessary to his need for a unique 
subject, led to a claim that there was an “underlying ontological distinction between 
levels of reality” (Lukes 1982:19). Between these two qualitatively distinct realms of 
reality is an “ . . . untraversable space of difference between the elements and the whole. 
This space only serves to indicate an essential difference in quality in these two forms of 
existence” (Hirst 1975:159).  
Durkheim so strongly privileged the upper domain, he had to deny backward or 
reciprocal causation from the individual. But how do social facts causally effect change 
on the individual, how do they cross the ontological divide? Durkheim’s mereological 
and metaphysical commitments left him with the concept of an emanative cause; a cause 
that leaves its initiator in order to produce an effect on a body outside the initiator (see p. 
27). However, an emanative cause can move from either domain to the other. Durkheim 
interpreted human experience “as if society was the basic reality and all other aspects of 
culture were derivative or secondary manifestations”  (LaCapra 1972:281). 
In addition to the problem of causation from one domain to the other, there was the 
second problem of causation within the higher domain of sui generis social facts. For 
Durkheim, the etiology of a social fact can only be another social fact. “The determining 
cause of a social fact should be sought among the social facts preceding it and not among 
the states of the individual consciousness” (1982[1895]:134).  
But he was vague on this causal relationship between social facts. How can sui generis 
social facts cause change in other sui generis social facts which are held to be the 
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unmoved mover? This is one of the few problems of sociology that Durkheim was 
content to assign to philosophy. A law of association provides no prime mover because 
the whole creates this effect, but the whole is an uncreated essence, the most idealist of 
concepts (Hirst 1975). In any case, an indeterminate emergence was not a promising 
argument for his principle of monocausality. Thus Durkheim’s task of completing the 
nomological structure of sociology “was unattainable as was the task of drawing a solid 
line between the social facts and the individual” (Turner 1986:151). 
Methodology 
The next chapter will take up the question of traditional quantitative methodology, its 
wider history, and its genealogy in American sociology. This section focuses on the 
relation of Durkheim’s methodology to his metaphysical commitment set.   
Durkheim made an epistemological commitment to a scientific method of discovery of 
social facts. This methodology rested on his essentialist ontological and epistemological 
commitments to scientific realism, transcendental types, absolute laws, and a truth of 
correspondence. This led to a process of justification of truth claims which combined 
positivism, empiricism, and scientism. “The common denominator [in Durkheim’s 
epistemology] was the orientation to regularity determinism or covering laws” (Steinmetz 
2005:285). As we saw in Chapter 2, deductive-nomological logic required uniform 
objects. Durkheim’s concept of essentialism as a formal cause was underwritten by the 
transcendentalism of Plato. “To conceive a thing is simultaneously to grasp more 
adequately its essential elements and to situate it within a whole” - Durkheim, quoted in 
(LaCapra 1972:576). 
 42 
He claimed that with empirical studies of a series of facts taken from just one unique 
society “ . . . we can succeed in establishing real laws without enlarging the scope of our 
research” (1982[1895]:155). While it is not clear how one might be required to adjust 
one’s method or sample size, it is claimed that we can discover other moral laws that   
 . . . are higher and less ephemeral because they are not bound to the special 
conditions in which particular political groups find themselves and are not tied to 
the destinies of such groups. . . . And it is evident that these more general and 
more constant ends are also higher ideals. (1958[1898]:72-73).  
He thought that the more we reduced these “special conditions,” the more our research 
moved from relative to universal claims, from the idiographic to the nomothetic (see p. 
27). This commitment to decontextualization was an important aspect of Durkheim’s 
epistemology. “In principle it may be postulated that social facts are more liable to be 
objectively represented the more completely they are detached from the individual facts 
by which they are manifested” (1982[1895]:82). Thus, when seeking the essences of 
moral facts as collective representations, all aspects of individual representations should 
be excised. The truth of essential properties becomes clearer when accidental properties 
are removed from consideration (see p.19). Durkheim created a methodology that 
discarded variations in temporal and geographic contexts as imperfections or noise; 
muddled images of transcendental social facts marred by the “trembling hand” of nature.  
Durkheim developed an uneasy blend of a methodological positivism and a neopositivist 
metaphysics that supported a neonaturalism in which social facts were immaterial yet 
available to scientific observation. Durkheim was “positivist” in the earliest sense of that 
term, which held that truth claims were “posited” by an authoritative source, in his case, 
society. But Durkheim’s epistemology was non-positivist, or perhaps more precisely 
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neopositivist, in its admittance of immaterial elements that were not available to direct 
observation.  
He used Mill’s argument from concomitance to develop a methodology to scientifically 
warrant claims of laws as derived from quantitative causal relations. This method 
assumed the existence of essential social types and utilized the argument from residues. 
The method [of concomitant variation] shows us the facts connecting with each 
other in a continuous fashion. . . . The manner in which a phenomenon develops 
expresses its nature. Constant concomitance is therefore by itself a law, regardless 
of the state of the phenomena left out of the comparison. Thus to invalidate the 
method it is not sufficient to show that it is inoperative in a few particular 
applications (1982[1895]:151). 
However, his argument from constant concomitance is specious because “ . . . he does not 
prove that these laws demonstrate anything other than the fact of concomitance itself”  
(Hirst 1975:105). He cannot give this proof, for the very possibility of his method rests 
on the supposition that “ . . . for two developments to correspond there must also be a 
correspondence in the natures manifested to them” (1982[1895]:151). Thus he assumes 
an ontological essentialism which was never well argued in his work. 
His model of sociological explanation was not only radically at variance with its 
own subject matter, applying causal analysis, on a supposed natural science 
analogy, through comparative correlational analysis or strategic case studies, 
within morphologically defined typologies, in a broadly evolutionary framework. 
It was also radically incomplete, vainly pursuing macro-laws without micro-
underpinnings (Lukes 1982:18).  
Ontology 
We have seen the epistemological problems with his mereology; there were also 
ontological problems. In a reductionist approach the properties of the higher domain are 
merely epiphenomenal and lose all ontological and causal independence; they can do no 
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work. This would have been a debilitating blow to Durkheim’s metaparadigm. He had to 
establish an ontology that would support upper domain entities as ontologically emergent. 
However, emergence relies on the parts and relationships of a lower domain (see p. 21). 
This caused Durkheim problems with his insistence on one-way mereological causation, 
the insistence that individuals do not have a causal effect on social facts. It led to 
contradictory statements.  
On one hand, he claimed that “ . . . what is most essential in the notion of social 
constraint is that collective ways of acting and thinking possess a reality existing outside 
individuals” (1982[1901]:45). However, these emergent properties, “. . . come into 
existence through a process of fusion or synthesis of individual representations” 
(1953[1924]:27). Also, “By aggregating together, by interpenetrating, by fusing together, 
individuals give birth to a being, psychical if you will, but one which constitutes a 
psychical individuality of a new kind” (1982[1895]:129). 
Thus, collective representations had to be more than reductionist epiphenomena, they had 
to be strongly emergent in order to act as an independent causal force (Durkheim and 
Wolff 1960[1858-1917]:335). Collective representations, as immaterial social facts, gain 
their own reality as they emerge from this interaction. Many interpreters of Durkheim 
characterize his ontological commitment as a "relational social realism" in which the 
association or network was real, although immaterial, and causally independent (Alpert 
1966:151-157; Challenger 1994:139-149; Emirbayer 1996:124-125; Wallwork 1972:5-
26). 
In the social sciences, idealists held that social phenomena were transcendent and 
unavailable to empiricist scientific methods. On the other side, scientifically minded 
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naturalists contended that human phenomena were indeed part of nature and available to 
scientific observation, yet causally reducible to materialistic and mechanistic entities, 
processes and events. Durkheim postulated a neonaturalism in which social facts were 
irreducible,  immaterial, and yet available to scientific observation through their traces or 
indices. This was his mediating response to the debate between idealists and naturalists 
regarding epistemic access to social facts (Challenger 1994:149-153; Wallwork 1972:9-
16).  
We can see how his claims of relational realism and neonaturalism were critical to his 
arguments for the institutionalization of sociology. A scientific realism or physicalism 
made social facts supervenient with no causal efficacy, and defeated his claim of social 
facts as sui generis. His response was a relational realism that underwrote the social fact 
as an ontological simple, immaterial yet real, and supported his argument of reality from 
coercive effect. He had to reject the idealist notions of social facts, or his claim of an 
empirical science built on observation would have been defeated. He also had to avoid 
the naturalist position that held for social facts as supervenient on individual 
representations.  
However, simply establishing immaterial social facts as real and available to empirical 
observation was not enough. Departmental sciences, such as physics, exhibited the power 
of prediction and transposition across cultures and time. Prediction and claims of 
transferable expert knowledge required a system that exhibited some level of reliable 
consistency. In order to provide laws, he needed some sort of anchor. He began by 
assuming that there actually were ontological uniformity and regular causal laws in social 
reality, just as in the natural sciences. He followed in the tradition of François Quesnay 
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who claimed “All social facts are held together by eternal, immutable, ineluctable, 
inevitable laws which individuals and governments would obey if they were once known 
to them” quoted in (Randall 1940:323).  
Covering laws require unit homogeneity (see p. 17). Durkheim made an ontological 
commitment to determining, transcendental social universals (Steinmetz 2005:281). A 
key factor of these universals is their manifestation as stable and objective. He sought to 
provide these characteristics by an appeal to essentialism. “[T]he physical manifestation 
does not define the essence of the social fact, but it does provide a guide, which we then 
use to ascertain this essence” (1982[1901]:42). Thus the essence of social “things” is only 
available through a study of their representations in observable, given, material, and real 
objective “things.”  
However, in a practical sense, social facts are rarely, if ever, uniform or the the results of 
representations of essential types. “There may be universal types such as representations 
of time and the person, but the actual content of the representations varies a great deal 
from society to society, and with time” (Pickering 2000:18). Over his life’s work we find 
varied claims regarding the “throw” of uniform social facts; sometimes they “are higher 
and less ephemeral … something more universal and more durable” and traceable across 
all cultures. At other times they are mutable and restricted to local cultures.  
Whatever the status of these universal forms, we could only know them through some 
sort of objective entity. In a practical sense, for a social fact to be objective, it helps if it 
will stand still for a suitable period of capture. But Durkheim’s relational realism 
included a stress on the dynamic nature of social facts as flows or currents. “Social life 
consists of free-ranging forces which are in a constant process of change” 
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(1982[1895]:82). This caused a problem with his claims of the effectiveness of 
sociologists as expert advisors to government policy. If social facts changed too quickly, 
their rhythm would make them unsuitable for the rhythm of social policy. He had two 
strategies to argue for his relational, dynamic flows as warrants for more stable social 
policies. 
First, he argued for a relative stability of institutions as the traces and residues of the 
currents of social facts. In this claim we can objectify the dynamic flows of immaterial 
social facts since they move slowly and deliberately, “as tomatoes do.” This is evidenced 
in their relatively stable material manifestations as crystallizations, the syntheses of 
individual interactions into institutions. “Law is enshrined in legal codes, the events of 
daily life are registered in statistical figures and historical monuments, fashions are 
preserved in dress, taste in works of art” (1982[1895]:71-72). To the degree that these 
institutions moved at a glacial pace, their ability to validate long-term policies was 
increased. But the state of institutions is still a trailing indicator, useful only if one 
believes social change is linear and progressive. Otherwise it offers little predictive 
power.  
What is the source of this formal or teleological cause of the putative uniformity in 
institutions? Durkheim proposed different aswers to this question. In a neo-Kantian move 
he attempted to find a priori categories, given to us not by a Kantian apparatus, but by 
the categories idealized in the social realm. “Durkheim joined forces with neo-Kantian 
discourse, suggesting that the a priori categories of knowledge are not supplied by the 
individual mind [as Kant would have it] but by the collective conscience of a social group” 
(Breslau 2000:260; Lukes 1985:440-441). “Sociology moved from Kant’s 
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epistemological a priori to the social a priori” (Lash 2009:175). Parsons suggested that 
Durkheim used functionalism as formal cause. His references to the constraining power 
of morphologies could be construed as a formal cause.11  
If Durkheim’s basic project was pursuit of institutional status, his attainment of a 
scientific authority for the practical policy of his constituency required the discovery and 
validation of social laws. “In order to warrant sociological expertise, Durkheim had to 
claim that social forces represented transcendental laws and essences” (Lehmann 
1993:51). 
Conclusion 
Durkheim’s work has been described as rich and fecund. Others have characterized it as 
self-contradictory, logically flawed, and linguistically, epistemically, and inherently 
vague. He owes his longevity in the sociological canon to the first description, while his 
critics note the latter.  
Durkheim’s social metaphysic . . .  presented a truncated and impoverished notion 
of reality which identified adequate analysis with the sacrifice of the richness and 
diversity of human experience on the altar of a unilateral fixation (LaCapra 
1972:281). 
__________________ 
11 For the argument of uniformity as a result of morphology and social environment see 
Durkheim, Emile. 1982[1895]. The Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on 
Sociology and Its Method. Free Press, Hirst, Paul Quentin. 1975. Durkheim. Bernard and 
Epistemology. Routledge. For functionalism, see Parsons. The theories relying on 
functionalism or morphologies as proposed by Durkheim are generally discounted today 
as structural-functional, but there are other reasons to leave them aside here. 
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Among the many characterizations of Durkheim’s overarching project I have focused on 
the institutionalization of sociology as a departmental science, the effects of that project 
on his first principles, and the interrelations within these metaphysical commitments.  
We can see the extent to which his philosophical infrastructure undergirds his body of 
work. His metaethical commitments were those of a moral realist who saw the abnormal 
as pathological, and claimed a moral expertise for his discipline, as required by his 
constituency.  
His epistemological and methodological commitments were intertwined. His 
epistemological commitments relied on a scientific approach to the traces of the 
transcendental in collective representations which were held to be real, yet immaterial, 
social entities. His commitment to explanation was based on a severely limited principle 
of causality. His methodology was based on empirical, though not completely positivist, 
procedures of observation. He developed at least the veneer of a scientific approach 
promising a taxonomy and meaningful description of social entities and properties. 
Following Comte’s “Savoir pour prévoir et prévoir pour pouvoir” - roughly, “Know in 
order to foresee and foresee in order to act,” he saw a future of explanation and prediction, 
if not control, of social behaviors. His entire program folded smoothly into the needs of 
the power base of his time and place.  
His ontological commitments to representations and categories were fundamental to his 
other first principles. Durkheim’s relational social realism and neonaturalism were 
motivated by his attempt to delineate for sociology a field of study all its own. This 
depended on showing that this new science dealt with a unique level of reality. His 
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mereological commitments to emergent entities were necessary to the establishment of 
social facts as ontological simples.  
Durkheim tried to establish the domain of sociology, not through a logically argued 
appeal to philosophical foundations, but with a weakly supported logic of the necessary 
character of social data, often based on the fallacy petitio principii and Mill’s argument 
from residues. His logic of explanation and proof was strongly influenced by the ideology 
of practical social intervention. In his moral fervor, he rejected as mysticism the notion 
that science cannot establish norms and goals. He rejected the primacy of individual 
agency, while at the same time providing sociology with a practical aim (Gane 1994). 
The fault lines in his set of metaphysical commitments were most evident in the failure of 
his methodology in the short run. In the long run, his methodology never achieved the 
success he envisioned. Even his methodological exemplar has fallen into disrepute. 
Durkheim was able to perform the analytic magic of Suicide just once. The book 
Suicide itself went into a ‘purgatory’ soon after its publication. The promise of 
social laws from The Rules was never realized, this remains the most telling blow 
against Durkheim’s philosophy (Turner 1986:160). 
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CHAPTER 4 – A GENEALOGY OF AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY 
Early American sociology reflected a set of first principles similar to those of Durkheim. 
This is partly explained by the similarity in the process of institutionalization and the 
interests of the American constituency. In America, the climate of the Progressive Era 
gave birth to a sociology marked by a moralistic identity and supported by a scientistic 
rationale. This chapter begins with a review of the institutionalization of American 
sociology. We will see that the sociocultural component made up for early problems in 
the intellectual and organizational components. It then explicates the nature of the 
metaethics that supported the moralistic identity, and the ontology and epistemology that 
underwrote the scientistic rationale. Along the way these first principles are evaluated for 
their validity and interrelationships. Finally, the chapter speaks to the resistance to new 
first principles.  
From 1890 to about 1930 American sociology had not established a clear intellectual 
component. It was without one clear leader, exemplar, or intellectual model.12 In 1904 
Karl Pearson confessed that, until that leader was found, he was skeptical of the 
American Sociological Society’s power to do effective work. “I believe it must be done 
by some one man who by force of knowledge, of method, and of enthusiasm hews out a 
new block and creates a school to carve out its details” (Galton 1904:6).  
__________________ 
12 Durkheim’s intellectual model did not appeal to early American sociology. His reified 
social facts did not align with the commitments to individualism and voluntarism by the 
American sociologists of the era. However, by the 1930’s Suicide was taken up by the 
statisticians and Durkheim’s metaethics were seen as a rationale for the theme of moral 
interventionism in American sociology Hinkle, Roscoe C. 1960. "Durkheim in American 
Sociology." Pp. 267-295 in Emile Durkheim, 1858-1917, edited by K. H. Wolff. The 
Ohio State University Press. 
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Oddly enough, American sociology was institutionalized before it found this leader, a 
“distinctive intellectual content, a distinctive method, or even a point of view” (Small 
1916). The leading departments in early sociology did not share one standard intellectual 
approach (Camic 1995). As George Vincent confessed in 1906, warring factions each 
claimed exclusive title to the field. Albion Small complained that sociology’s embattled 
state within and without the population labeled "sociologists" made the field's various 
stalwarts more concerned for their occupational security than for the disinterested pursuit 
of truth (Kuklick 1980a:205). The earliest programs of sociology in America thus faced 
the charge of intellectual irrelevance.  
Despite these incomplete and scattered intellectual models, sociology was able to gain 
public and private support based on its perceived instrumentalist value. It was thought 
that sociology could develop scientific recommendations for social policies, and rational, 
if not empirical, support for moral reform. Thus, the power of its constituency trumped 
the problems of intellectual and organizational solidarity. 
This constituency was based on the Progressive movement, a loosely bound coalition of 
religious groups, private charities, research institutes, and municipal and state reformers. 
They pursued social reforms that would repair what they saw as the damage done by 
laissez-faire economics and the exploitation of the common man by big business. The 
Progressive Era sought a science that would lead and validate the group’s meliorist and 
interventionist attitudes toward social problems. The Progressives believed that 
sociologists would “employ science in the amelioration of social evils” (Hinkle and 
Hinkle 1954:2) and produce grand syntheses of principles that would "accelerate social 
evolution” through rational social management (Kuklick 1980a:205). Its constituency 
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required not just a moralist identity, but also the validation of the reformer as scientist. It 
was believed that, because of his scientism, the “sociologist is one of the ablest men to 
make decisions concerning social policy” (O'Kelly and Petras 1970:334).  
Moralistic identity 
The leadership of early sociology in America recognized the advantages of establishing 
its identity as moral interventionists. Albion Small saw that if the sociologist did not 
accept this role, then other institutions would emerge that would make the decisions. 
“Sociology’s true end lies not in the gathering of knowledge on social processes, but in 
putting this knowledge to work for the guiding of these processes to more rational ends” 
(1914:445). He argued that sociology should confine its attentions to “social problems 
such as race relations, collective behavior, urban disorder, and the like” (Kuklick 
1980a:205). Franklin H. Giddings also directed sociology to enter the fields of public 
policy, education, missions, and social work. Edward A. Ross believed that “Christianity 
was the highest stage of religion in a civilization that had already reached the highest 
stage of development . . . ” (Vidich and Lyman 1982:1058, 1060). In his mind the moral 
duty of sociology was to unite society under this moral paradigm. “Attack upon the 
maladjustments among men is an inevitable consequence of the development of social 
science” (Ross 1920:545). 
In order to mount these attacks, the social sciences stepped up their recruitment and 
training. The Progressive Era required a large group of newly-trained, upper middle-class 
graduates who were able to pull together disparate reformist groups to present a united 
front as policy claims-makers (Chambers 2000:138). The new departmental science 
increased academic positions and produced a greater number of graduates (Geiger 2000). 
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The early undergraduate curriculum was focused on preparation for the general 
evangelistic vision of moral interventionism. As C. H. Cooley wrote in 1911, "I think of 
the introductory sociology class as a nursery of social workers who are to go out over the 
land and build up a better democracy, and I try to impart this idea to the students" 
(Kuklick 1980b:43).  
The adoption of a moralistic identity reveals a set of metaethical first principles that were 
not that much different from those of Durkheim. The meliorist and interventionist role 
was based on a belief in moral realism and truth-apt moral knowledge claims (see p. 24). 
Although not all early sociologists had an agenda as specific as that of Ross, the 
Progressive Era provided its own set of moral codes13 which were held to be universal 
and immutable transcendental ideals.  
Scientistic rationale 
Marching in step with the moralistic identity of sociology was the second subtext; that of 
scientism. A moralistic identity was necessary but not sufficient for the establishment of 
sociology as a departmental science. As we saw earlier, the claim of a connection with 
the pure sciences was also a political move in the quest for a unique subject and territory.  
A departmental science required a scientific methodology. Sociology’s adoption of a 
scientistic rationale began with the evolution of five disciplines in the nineteenth century: 
anthropology, economics, history, political science, and sociology (Wallerstein 1988). 
Each discipline developed distinct methods of collecting data in order to claim scientific 
__________________ 
13 The Progressives’ moral leadership included clergy from Protestantism and its Social 
Gospel wing, Puritanism from the North, and Presbyterianism from the South.  
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authority. Those who took the idiographic approach relied on the value of narrative. 
History was predominant here while anthropology straddled the fence. Economics, 
sociology, and political science took up the nomothetic approach by utilizing the methods 
of the “pure” sciences (see p. 27). 
By 1909, it was argued that any body of knowledge gained its scientific rank based on its 
methodology. Sociology had its own methodological scheme and “to that extent its 
pretensions to rank as a science are well founded (Ford 1909:246). This nomothetic 
guarantee was necessary regardless of any moral agenda. “The point at issue is not 
whether sociology means well, but whether it is true - true in the sense that it has a vision 
of reality and is not misled by appearances” (Ford 1909:245).  
Representative figures in early American sociology, among them Ward, Small, and 
William Sumner sought objective evidence to scientifically warrant the moral reform 
they desired.14 Sociology associated quantitative results with objective warrants as the 
foundation of its claims to the scientific proofs of moral policy. Advocates of quantitative 
methods appealed to mathematics as a precise, unambiguous language which could 
extend our powers of deductive reasoning far beyond those of purely verbal methods. As 
with logic, the validity of mathematical reasoning was held to be a “black-and-white” 
affair.  
__________________ 
14 As Bannister puts it, by gaining "control over self and others," the objectivist had "the 
exquisite pleasure of playing God while denying His existence" Bannister, Robert C. 
1987. Sociology and Scientism: The American Quest for Objectivity, 1880-1940. 
University of North Carolina Press. 
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This claim of the justificatory power of numbers was not without its critics. In 1902 the 
philosopher Charles S. Peirce attacked the assumption that quantitative methods made 
sociology more rigorous. When the sociologist employed "the phraseology of 
mathematics," asked Peirce, did he "imagine that he thereby render[ed] vague ideas 
precise?" (Bannister 1987:76-77). Wittgenstein would later say, “(I)n life . . . we use 
mathematics only to infer from propositions which do not belong to mathematics, to 
others which equally do not belong to mathematics” quoted in  (Sayer 1992:176). 
Sociology took up the mathematics of European statistical methods because they were 
expected to offer the sought-after scientific rigor (Camic and Xie 1994). Among the 
natural sciences, the methodology of statistics had enjoyed the early support of the 
science of astronomy15. However, it should be recognized that astronomy used statistics 
to offset problems of measurement due to imprecise technology of the telescopes of the 
time, and not because of some inherent mysterious random behavior in the paths 
described by celestial bodies.  
Whatever its strengths and failures, statistics was used by early departments of sociology 
to do boundary work that would identify their new discipline as an objective science 
(Oberschall 1972). Statistics was associated with objectivity in two ways. First, because it 
purported to provide an unbiased objective look at its subject, it was held to be impartial. 
Second, it was claimed to be the process of discovery of objective, or transcendental, 
facts. “Both sets of claims now ring hollow” (Schweber 2001:547).  
__________________ 
15 The astronomer Adolphe Quetelet was attracted to statistics for this reason. Once the 
technology of telescopes improved there was little use for statistics in that field, but by 
then Quetelet had moved to a statistique morale. 
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Over its history, statistics developed as both a mathematical science and as an applied, 
instrumentalist source of government policy. A distinction arose between the 
mathematics of statistical theory and the administration and instrumental use of applied 
statistical studies. In the latter case, statistics began as a bureaucratic tool before it found 
its way into academia. Alain Desrosières describes the evolution of modern 
administrative statistics as inextricably bound up with the state’s need for warrants for 
policy and establishment of their power.  State policies were based on the ability of 
statistics to produce mathematical artifacts that were used to both dictate the duties of the 
state and measure its successes (1998). Censuses were connected to programs aimed at 
managing populations, which began to be seen as capital assets of the state. Soldiers were 
measured for strength, while statistics of births, disease and death indicated inventory 
turnover.  
Early administrative statisticians such as Adolphe Quetelet injected these uses of 
descriptive statistics into modern sociology. Quetelet’s first study dealt with the size of 
men, the second with criminal tendencies. Like Durkheim, he also assumed  an 
equivalence between the natural, the “right,” and the normal.  He applied this concept to 
his study on the size of men. He thought that “Nature, like the marksman, kept trying to 
hit a perfect size.” Karl Pearson noted that Quetelet actually took this concept from 
Newton’s theology, and that its adoption by Quetelet and others was more theological 
and sociological than mathematical (Hacking 1984:171-172).  
Based on his statistical studies, Quetelet claimed to have first discovered immutable 
social laws. This was one of the earliest moves from association to law. “The notion of 
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‘law’ was now extended: the distributions themselves and their mathematical derivations, 
as well as their constancy over time and place, became laws” (Lazarsfeld 1961:297).  
It was but a short jump from the discovery of social laws to their use in moral reform 
through social control. One of the first social statisticians, Frédéric le Play, argued that 
comparative analysis revealed the conditions under which people are happy or unhappy. 
This knowledge was to be conveyed to the elite of a country, who were supposed to take 
the necessary measures so that favorable conditions prevailed (Lazarsfeld 1961:303). In 
America, this rationale led to a new emphasis on the quantitative training, and thus the 
professionalization, of sociologists, by the establishment of “. . . the occupation of a 
distinct intellectual preserve; a standardized academic career, with formal training 
requirements; and occupational associations and journals” (Kuklick 1980a:203). Thus, 
sociology would be institutionalized once the intellectual and organizational requirements 
were satisfied and a unique territory was gained.  
The Social Survey movement and Science of Sociology 
Sociology took up the administrative applications of statistics (rather than its 
mathematical theory) to warrant knowledge claims from its new source of data, the social 
survey (Desrosières 1998). The Social Survey Movement began shortly after the turn of 
the last century and established the social survey as the data collection tool of choice. 
Thus, the survey became the foundation for scientific intervention in community affairs.  
By 1911, it was thought that sociology’s science followed the “scientific method of 
induction of which the social survey is the comprehensive type” (Riley 1911). By 1914, 
papers listing and recommending the concepts and processes of descriptive statistics 
became more prevalent (Chapin 1914+Burgess, 1916 #11799). By 1920, courses in social 
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surveying were offered at many major universities. The University of Chicago offered a 
course in social statistics as early as 1911 (Bulmer 1981:317).  
In large American cities, departments of sociology directed students who were utilizing 
social surveys for social problems, such as the condition of children. It was generally 
thought that all departments of sociology should train men and women to be expert social 
surveyors. “When this is done, as it surely will be done, the expert investigator will be 
capable of seeing beyond the immediate implications of his findings to their wider 
significance” (Taylor 1920:755).  
Sociology as science 
In many ways, the pursuit of a scientistic rationale was a political project. The choice of 
methodological approaches revealed sociology's ontological commitment to social laws 
and universal types, and the epistemological commitment to a deductive-nomological 
logic (see p. 26). As we saw in the last chapter (see p. 46), the ontological assumptions of 
the method “ . . . included unit homogeneity, the validity of isolating on a few causal 
variables, little interaction effect between variables, and no reciprocal causation” (Hall 
2003:382).   
In the tradition of Francis Bacon, sociologists believed in a world that was a universal 
book of the inventory of homogeneous units. Shakespeare gestured to his contemporary’s 
sentiment with the soothsayer’s comment in Antony and Cleopatra, “In nature's infinite 
book of secrecy/A little I can read” (I.ii. 10-11).  
Early American sociology recognized the need for “a coherent, generally accepted 
ground pattern on which to construct our design or plan of the new social order that must 
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arise out of the present world-chaos” (Bushnell 1919:41). Since 1919, sociology went 
through more than one “major wave of categorization, so characteristic of the history of 
the social sciences” (Lazarsfeld 1961:331).  
Sociology’s epistemological commitment was to the belief that the essence of these 
categories could be isolated by ruthlessly paring away accidental properties. (Connolly 
2004; Sil 2004:ch 14). The methodology was based on faith in the possibility of inducing 
laws from isolated, radically decontextualized cases. “With regard to social ontology, 
scientism led sociologists to hold that natural causal structure was not variable across 
time, space and interactional contexts” (Steinmetz 2005:28). However, early attempts to 
discover these absolute social types never yielded a reliable taxonomy of these universal 
types. “With little exception [our quantitative methods] are bound temporally, spatially, 
and culturally and are inadequately cast to serve as clear instances of generic sociological 
categories” (Blumer 1956). Consequently, we now take a general approach to 
methodology where time is instantaneous and place nonexistent.  
Problems of causality 
Early American sociology’s commitment to essential categories implied a principle of 
monocausality, a simple causal relationship whose strength could be discovered by its 
method’s radical decontextualization (Grusky and Di Carlo 2001). In such a causal 
relationship, the goal is to discover the antecedents that must necessarily cause the effect. 
These are always limited to a one-to-one relationship in Durkheim’s mind. Thus our 
methodology made a strong commitment to the principle of necessary causal 
relationships (Braumoeller and Goertz 2000). However, this principle has been the 
subject of much criticism. 
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J. L. Mackie argues that the usual talk of "cause" in social science research in fact refers 
to INUS conditions. INUS refers to an insufficient but non-redundant part of a condition 
which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the occurrence of the effect. For example, 
imagine a collection of events: a short circuit, the proximity of flammable material, and 
the absence of firefighters. Together these are unnecessary but sufficient to a house's 
burning to the ground, since many other collections of events certainly could have led to 
the same result. Within this collection, the short circuit is an insufficient (since the short 
circuit by itself would not have caused the fire, but the fire would not have happened 
without it, everything else being equal) but non-redundant part of a condition which is 
itself unnecessary (since something else could have also caused the house to burn down) 
but sufficient for the occurrence of the effect. Thus, the short circuit is an INUS condition 
for the occurrence of the house burning down. (We will see in chapter 6 that Deleuze 
looks to Leibniz’s principle of sufficient cause.) If the causal relationships in the social 
world are actually INUS conditions - and results suggest they are - then the current 
decontextualizing approach is even more off the mark.  
A methodology that is unable to provide precise specifications of like causal links 
weakens any commitment to causal relationships as warrants for explanatory power. Yet 
our commitment to constant conjunction and concomitant variation as warrants of 
explanatory power remains a standard in our field.  
Aside from the logical problems of our assumptions, there is also the problem of 
sociology’s highly mutable phenomena (Cole 1994). This mutability further confounds 
our claims of precise causal links. As we saw above, in order to deal with stochastic 
behavior, sociology turned to statistical methods. However, it should be recognized that 
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formal statistical inference is, by its nature, conditional. If we hope to make causal 
inferences from patterns of association through the use of statistics, our lack of certainty 
in our “causal” hypotheses points to the limits of this approach (Freedman 1999). There 
is also no reliable way to measure counterfactuals — that is, to know what would have 
happened had we not, say, executed some policy — because so many other factors 
influence the outcome.  
Since the hypotheses of the social sciences are untested by true experiments, sociology 
remains limited to quasi-experimental techniques and this limitation “reflects the 
operation of happenstance” (Cook and Campbell 1986; Manzi 2010). Quasi-experimental 
methodology relies on statistical control specifying a “smaller number of variables that 
have to be ‘somehow’ combined to ‘sometimes’ produce a desired effect” (Cook and 
Campbell 1986:172). 
Some critics charge that statistical methods have yet to resolve any non-trivial problems 
(Edling 2002). Part of the blame is attributed to what are seen as disconnects between the 
actual social world and the basic regression model. It is claimed that this model is built 
on the assumption of a social world in which phenomena are related to one another in a 
way that describes a straight line on a two-dimensional graph. Critics argued that there is 
little evidence that this is the case in the social world. “The domination of the regression 
model has led us down a blind alley, causing us . . to overlook true relationships because, 
not being linear and additive, they cannot be revealed by the regression model” 
(McGregor 1993:802). 
Sociology believed that its methodology would provide membership in the pure sciences. 
The claim was that “the materialist and extensionalist methodology fitted to the physical 
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sciences should fit the human sciences as well, if we intend to count them as proper 
sciences” (Margolis 2002:1). Even though the  “proper sciences” such as physics have 
developed new ontological and methodological first principles, sociology has continued 
with its early assumptions. We continue to apply perspectives developed in the early 
physical and natural sciences to social phenomena today “with little, if any, attention to 
the context within which they were originally developed” (Mathews, White, and Long 
1999b:457). Over the history of the departmental science of sociology, the physical 
sciences have moved away from that context. They have developed tools better suited to 
physical systems as flows, such as the methodology of thermodynamics. I will argue that 
these approaches are much better models for the social and other dynamic open systems.  
Unlike the physical sciences, sociology has not evolved in its ontological commitments to 
identity and its epistemological commitments to positivism. Methodological positivism 
became the dominant position within “sociology, psychology, and political science in the 
US after WWII. . . . Whether positivism is still dominant is an open question” (Steinmetz 
2004:380). 
Many argue that it is far from an open question, that positivism is alive and well in 
sociology to the extent that it is committed to regularity determinism, concomitant 
variation, and constant conjunction (Steinmetz 2005; Van Den Berg 2006). While it may 
be difficult to find a contemporary sociologist who would defend the philosophy of 
logical positivism, aspects of methodological positivism remain pervasive elements in 
our curriculum and our practices.  
Sociology as activist 
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As part of sociology’s moralistic identity, there is a long history of supporting social 
activism by providing a “social narrative with a moral intent” (Seidman 1991:136). There 
are also criticisms of what is seen as a type of unethical behavior in our scientism; the 
practice of claiming objective support for claims based on our own political or moral 
principles. Horowitz argues that our disingenuous claim of epistemic objectivity is belied 
by the moralism of sociologists who are driven by the “politics of advocacy and the 
ideology of self-righteousness” (1993:5). There is a widespread suspicion that results of 
scientific methods are often used to support normative agendas in the social sciences. 
This is an “ideological delirium that finally, while considering itself to be thoroughly 
scientific, also assumed that most everyone else was running around afflicted with false 
consciousness” (Berger 1992:10).  
When we claim scientific support for moralistic interventions we can easily use the claim 
of scientism to sway policy decisions toward our own normative agendas. Frances Fox 
Piven refers to this as “research as political performance,” a metaphor that is similar to 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s characterization of quantitative methodology:  
I have sometimes been tempted to think of it as essentially a histrionic subject: 
how to act the part of a natural scientist on the stage of the social sciences with 
the more technical parts of the discipline functioning as do greasepaint, false 
beards, and costumes in the theater (1998[1979]:61) 
Piven questions whether orthodox quantitative methods in sociology produce any useful 
findings to support policy. We produce scientific results, based on linear cause-and-effect 
relationships, which are seldom accurate reflections of social reality. A government’s 
“attempt to build policies on such fictive foundations are thus doomed to failure. The 
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usefulness of social science to government is not as a guide to crafting policy, but as a 
means of providing scientific justification to partisan initiatives” (2004:85). 
Conclusions 
We cut up nature, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significancies as we do 
largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it this way (Whorf 
1956:213). 
This section has examined the development of early sociology in America; the evolution 
of the institution and its constituency, the contents of our metaethical, ontological and 
epistemological principles, and the development of traditional quantitative methods and 
their components. Our identity as moralists and as scientists are both intertwined with the 
political needs of institutionalization and our choice of methodology. Although these 
methods  
. . . have contributed scarcely anything to our understanding of social 
phenomena . . . demands for further attempts in this direction are still presented to 
us as the latest revolutionary innovations which, if adopted, will secure rapid 
undreamed of progress (Hayek 1942:268). 
Unlike physics or biology, the social sciences have not demonstrated the capacity to 
produce a substantial body of reliable predictive rules about what they study. Perhaps 
“we live within a view of social reality that we ourselves do not really believe. Our 
theoretical hearts are one place, our empirical heads another” (Manzo 2007:149). But our 
inherited methodology is our most rigid panoply, the site of our deepest investments, and, 
to some extent, constitutes the identity of American sociology.   
The methods and techniques of the sciences have exercised a tyranny over sociology, one 
which we are unlikely to overturn. At this point the investment in this tradition may be 
too deep. For example, methodological articles published in our major journals have 
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significantly higher citation rates (Peritz 1983); quantitative research skills are a leading 
source of income for our graduates (Lyon 1995); and our pride of place in policy science 
relies on quantitative results.  
However, a dogmatic commitment to any particular method can lead to proselytizing, 
coercive assimilation, and the religious intractability of the moralist. “Methodological 
debates are akin to religious ones, and like religious ones, conversions are possible, but 
faith is often durable even in the face of disconfirming evidence” (Shapiro, Smith, and 
Masoud 2004:10). Some of the critics, resigned to the futility of a new Methodenstreit, 
simply hunker down and speak in “grammatical voices so passive as to suggest a drug 
problem” (Davis 1994:180).  
New ontologies? 
Where might sociology go from here? If our methods of inquiry fail to cut the world at its 
joints, then we should reinvestigate our principles of ontology (Katz 2002). This practice 
of criticizing the significance of our ontological commitments is becoming more 
acceptable (Hall 2003:374).  
Wendy Brown criticized the ontology and epistemology of political groups. She argues 
that many “contemporary political formations ostensibly concerned with emancipation” 
retain an “ungrounded persistence in ontological essentialism and epistemological 
foundationalism” which results in undercutting any liberating effects they might hope to 
have (Brown 1995:36-37). In another example, Elisabeth Ellis argues for a 
methodological commitment that encompasses fallibilism, a sensitivity to a wide variety 
of explanators, and an openness to the proposition that significant factors may not be 
measurable in any ordinary sense (2004).  
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Ian Shapiro proposes a different ontology of immanent naturalism, which eschews the 
notion that the world is a well-ordered place governed by laws that can be determined by 
social scientists (2004:11). He suggests an ontology of a social world which is in a state 
of constant and unpredictable flux.  
Sociologists today are faced with a fundamental dilemma: whether to conceive of 
the social world as consisting primarily in substances or in processes, in static 
“things” or in dynamic, unfolding relations. Large segments of the sociological 
community continue implicitly or explicitly to prefer the former point of view. . . . 
But increasingly, researchers are searching for viable analytic alternatives, 
approaches that reverse these basic assumptions and depict social reality instead 
in dynamic, continuous, and processual terms (Emirbayer 1997:281).  
The next chapter considers an alternative commitment set in philosophy, one which 
rejects identity and representations. It is a view of the world as immanent and dynamic. 
This is a tradition developed through Scotus, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Bergson, and 
Whitehead as developed by Gilles Deleuze. The ontological commitment is to ontological 
primitives that are not ideal forms traced in imperfect copies but to immanent haecceities, 
and to dynamic causal chains. The most practical benefit of a Deleuzean sociology would 
follow from an expansion of our quantitative methods.  
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CHAPTER 5 - DELEUZE’S PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS	  
Unabashedly systemic, Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy is not by that token 
doctrinal, in the sense it would allow itself to be reduced or represented by a set of 
conveniently enumerable theses (Toscano 2004:xiv).  
The writings of poststructuralist philosopher Gilles Deleuze are intentionally 
designed to defy summary. . . . They are nevertheless highly ordered and produce 
concrete effects, including situated meanings and verifiable propositions 
(Massumi 1996:395).  
Deleuze aimed to develop a coherent and logically sound philosophical infrastructure. 
His metaethics was a type of virtue ethics modeled on the Stoics and Nietzsche, his 
ontology was one of immanence (see p. 20), and his epistemology rested on a principle of 
immanent causation (see p. 27). He used a number of original concepts (the event, 
assemblage, univocity, and others) to give his work coherence. His commitment set 
provides a rich potential for the theory and practice of sociology.  
Deleuze took as his problem the long history of the failure of representation, and what he 
saw as the mistaken notion of the immanent as an imperfect copy of a transcendent 
absolute. He sought to unearth and critically examine the presuppositions he had 
absorbed in his education, especially the deep-seated privileging of identity and 
equivalence. He recognized how the traditional teaching of the history of philosophy 
worked to constrain a revisionary metaphysics. Deleuze commented that the traditional 
history of philosophy had “. . . always been the agent of power in philosophy, and even in 
thought. It has played the role of a repressor: A formidable school of intimidation” 
(2002[1977]:12-14). 
Plato, Kant, and Hegel were significant actors in what he thought of as the “official” 
tradition, or what he came to call a “state” philosophy (Deleuze 1990a[1969]:157-58; 
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Deleuze 1997[1990]:135-36; Deleuze and Guattari 1994[1991]:28). He explored a 
different lineage, what he would call a “minor” tradition. “I liked writers who seemed to 
be part of the history of philosophy, but who escaped from it in one respect, or altogether: 
Lucretius, Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche, Bergson” (2002[1977]:14-15). This alternate 
history of philosophy “unsettled the transcendental subject at its origins” (Neil 1998:429; 
Smith 2009b).  
Deleuze asked, “What is the best way of following the great philosophers, to repeat what 
they have said, or to do what they have done, that is, to create concepts for problems that 
are necessarily changing?”  (1994[1991]:28). His approach was similar to the practice of 
the medieval commentary as an  
 . . . effort to revitalize a philosophy, by a judicious combination of detailed 
excavation, on the one hand, and the potentially catalytic adjunction of new 
components, on the other (Toscano 2004:xiv).  
Preferring the toolbox over the hymnal, Deleuze “inhabited” the philosophers of this 
alternate tradition. In an oft-quoted passage he presented his approach to other 
philosophers as a kind of “buggery” that would produce “monsters”. Deleuze sought 
monsters that would provide a new decentering of the traditional readings of the 
philosopher at hand (1997[1990]:6). However, his energy was not solely aimed at the 
destruction of the traditional metaphysics of his day in the sense that America tended to 
read postmodernism and poststructuralism. 
Deleuze was actually puzzled by the fact that his texts, along with those of other French 
philosophers, had been characterized as postmodern in America. He believed that it was a 
result of a highly complex set of misunderstandings, misinterpretations, and investments 
that were political and historical. For Deleuze, postmodernism was  
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 . . . a shameful advertising and selling of concepts like products where critique is 
replaced by sales promotion. Like marketing, the claims regarding the end of 
philosophy, end of metaphysics, and so forth, are what Deleuze calls pointless 
idle incoherencies (Robinson 2005:167-68). 
Poststructuralism did not fare much better in America. It was thought to be limited to a 
pars destruens, a total destruction, which left us nowhere to go. However, pars destruens 
simply cleared the stage so that  “thinking can engage with pars construens, a creation, or 
invention, and thus a praxis and poetics without guarantee”  (Negri 1991:xv). Deleuze did 
not announce the cliché of “the end of metaphysics”, but sought a more lucid approach to 
a general and revisionary metaphysics. He suggested that “. . .  the philosophical task is 
not to attempt to ‘overcome’ metaphysics, but rather to actively construct a different 
metaphysics” (Smith 2007:49-50).   
Therefore, it is more productive to read Deleuze not as a dismissal of Western 
metaphysical tradition, but as an affirmation of a new metaphysics (Hardt 1993). This 
new metaphysics would be more sensitive to discoveries in the new physics, as opposed 
to the 19th century physics extant during the development of early American sociology.  
I feel myself to be a pure metaphysician. Bergson says that modern science hasn't 
found its metaphysics, the metaphysics it would need. It is this metaphysics that 
interests me, Deleuze cited in (Smith 2009b).  
Ontology 
Unlike Durkheim, Deleuze began with ontology, and so shall we. The important aspects 
of Deleuze’s ontological infrastructure are an immanent reality; univocity of being; 
events as forces and assemblages; a transcendental empiricism; the virtual and the actual; 
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and a mereology of dynamic, open systems. Throughout his work he was intent upon 
defeating the traditional logic of the philosophy of identity; the final authority of the One. 
In so-called rationalist philosophies, the abstract is given the task of explaining, 
and it is the abstract that is realized in the concrete. One starts with abstractions 
such as the One, the Whole, the Subject, and one looks for the process by which 
they are embodied in a world (2002[1977]:vii). 
Deleuze argued that the primacy of the transcendent or the abstract was based on an early 
hope for order. Its most celebrated proponent was Plato. “The poisoned gift of Platonism 
is to have introduced transcendence into philosophy, to have given transcendence a 
plausible philosophical meaning” (1997[1993]:137).  
For Deleuze, the essential Platonic distinction was more profound than the distinction 
between model and copy, original and image. In Deleuze’s reading, the aim of Platonism 
was to deprive nature of the being that is immanent to it, to reduce nature to a 
representation of   “. . . a transcendent Idea capable of imposing its likeness upon a 
rebellious matter” (1994[1968]:128). Platonic instantiations gave the mere illusion of the 
identity of the Idea, however, for Deleuze the only illusion “is that of unmasking 
something or someone” (1994[1968]:106).  
Deleuze read Plato’s work as an attempt to solve the problems of simulacra (Widder 
2001). Plato’s representation was an image endowed with resemblance. His bane was the 
simulacrum as an image without resemblance (1990a[1969]:257). The danger of the 
simulacrum, for Plato, was that it did away with the illusion of the face behind the mask, 
his hierarchy of Idea, and representation as imitation (1994[1968]:69).  
Plato hoped to discredit simulacra as perversions of the form, false claimants, essential 
perversions or deviations from the Idea (1990a[1969]:253-265). Deleuze argued that 
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simulacra were not some imperfect copies added secondarily “over and above” the 
original term. On the contrary, they were “ . . . the internal genetic elements of repetition 
itself, its integral and constituent parts” (1994[1968]:17; Smith 2005:112). 
Deleuze dismissed the Ideas of Plato in favor of an immanent ontology that “ . . . would 
deny the existence of anything beyond, higher than, superior to Being” (Smith 2003:46). 
Thus, his revisionary metaphysics of immanence was a critique of the philosophy of 
representation which has dominated Western philosophy since Plato. 
Modern thought was born out of the failure of representation, as the loss of 
identities, and the discovery of all the forces that were acting under the 
representation of the identical (1994[1968]:117).  
Another target of his revisionary metaphysics was the traditional commitment to 
equivocal and analogical Being. The question is, “Given that Being is said of beings, ‘x 
is’, in what sense is it said?” Duns Scotus developed three concepts of this “saying”: 
equivocity, univocity and analogy. When Being is said of God and man in an equivocal 
or analogical sense, it implies that there are qualitatively different levels of being. We can 
think of the representations and Ideas of Plato, or the social fact and individual of 
Durkheim. In both cases “What you are disconnects you from other things, once and for 
all, and positions you in a hierarchy of distinct sets of categories” (Williams 2003:62-63). 
On the other hand, when Being is said in the univocal sense it is said of every being and 
in the same sense (1990a[1969]:177-80; Smith 2009a), and thus defeats transcendent 
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categories of levels of reality. However, when Being is said in the same sense of all, this 
univocal ontology must somehow account for differences between beings.16 
Deleuze had to explain this difference between beings without recourse to Plato’s  Ideas, 
Aristotle’s accidental properties, or what he saw as the sedentary distribution of Kantian 
categories. 17  Deleuze chose to employ Spinoza’s claim of one univocal substance 
differentiated in individual beings based on modes of intensity. In Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze replaced general laws, universals, and essences with multiplicities, or 
differences in intensity, that constituted individuations. It is important to recognize that 
difference in intensity is a non-categorical difference; it does not rely on the One. “A 
typological difference between substantive multiplicities, in short, is substituted for the 
dialectical opposition of the one and the multiple” (Smith 2009b). We do not ask to know 
the essence of a thing, but its intensities in the sense of its affective capacities (Smith 
2001:175).  
From this concept, Deleuze was able to develop a realist ontology that redefined the 
universal as individuals, particular things, or actual entities produced by processes of 
individuation. Without any need for transcendent or external productive principles 
(traditional views of self, cause, God, etc.) the actual is the product of nothing but the 
__________________ 
16 “If we say that Being is univocal, then we seem to fall into the thought of infamy: the 
thought of the inessential, the formless, the non-specific, the non-generic, the 
noncategorical” Smith, Daniel W. 2001. "The Doctrine of Univocity: Deleuze's Ontology 
of Immanence." Filozofski Vestnik 22(1):163-179. 
17 “Kant balanced his world on thought – oblivious to the scanty supply of thinking” 
Whitehead, Alfred North. 1979[1929]. Process and Reality (Gifford Lectures Delivered 
in the University of Edinburgh During the Session 1927-28). Free Press. 
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internal difference of its own self-realizing occurrences; occurrences which create ever 
new and more complex combinations. (Robinson 2005:159). Thus, in Deleuze’s ontology, 
universals do not precede multiples, but a process of difference produces multiplicities. 
"The first principle of philosophy is that Universals explain nothing but must themselves 
be explained” (1994[1968]:7).  
Aristotle, relying on Plato’s Ideas, had suggested that uniformity and individuation were 
explained by essential and accidental properties, respectively (see p. 19). In response, 
Deleuze employed Spinoza’s distinction between propria and properties. Spinoza had 
argued that the attributes that have traditionally been ascribed to God are not attributes 
but mere propria, that is, the non-essential peculiarities of a species. For example the 
ability to laugh is said to be a proprium of man; it is not essential to the definition of man 
as a rational animal. Spinoza held that the propria of God told us nothing of the divine 
essence (Smith 2001:172). 
Deleuze was able to solve the problem of individuation by valorizing immanence and 
difference, but he was still left with the problem of uniformity, that is, how sets of entities 
could be seen as likes. Deleuze argued that sets of likes were the product of contingent, 
yet occasionally similar genetic processes; dynamic processes that were often marked by 
attractors and phase states as we will discuss in the next chapter. For now, it is enough to 
recognize that, in a Deleuzean ontology, likes are not the result of formal causes. On the 
contrary “. . . resemblance and identity must be treated not as fundamental but as 




The Problem of Regularity 
Deleuze constantly critiqued the “tracing” operation by which particulars in real 
experience were said to be conditioned by identities in the transcendental. Thus, he could 
not appeal to the traditional explanation of regularity based on transcendental types. As 
we have seen, the deductive-nomological logic dismissed non-uniform effects as 
imperfect copies. Deleuze shifted the ontological emphasis to these immanent, non-
uniform effects as the emergence of the “new”. 
Deleuze was interested in the ontological conditions under which something new can 
appear in the world. “The aim is not to rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to find 
the conditions under which something new is produced (creativeness)” (2002[1977]:vii). 
He pursued this goal by developing his concepts of the virtual/actual and the possible/real 
(Goodchild 1996:4-5; Massumi 1992:167-170).  
Deleuze argued that the real cannot explain or produce the new. In his view, the real is 
nothing more than the working-out of what was already prefigured and envisioned as 
possible. When a possibility is realized - when it does come into existence - no actual 
creation has taken place. “Mere possibility is not generative or productive; it is not 
enough to make anything happen” (Shaviro 2009:34-35). 
In opposition to the principle of causation built on the possible/real, Deleuze employed a 
concept of the virtual as a transcendental field or structure, conditioning and generating 
the actual. According to this system, the virtual "possesses a full reality by itself" 
(1994[1968]:211). It is just that this reality is not actual. The virtual is like a field of 
energies that have not yet been expended, or a reservoir of potentialities that have not yet 
been tapped. His argument for the virtual/actual contradicted a metaphysics of presence, 
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for when the virtual is actualized it “ . . . breaks with resemblance as a process no less 
than it does with identity as a principle” (1994[1968]:211-12). Actualization is a part of 
the process of differentiation and, unlike the causal link between the possible and the real, 
is always a creation.  
The Event 
Having established individuation based on modes of intensity, Deleuze needed an 
ontological simple that was dynamic as opposed to static. He proposed events, or 
singularities, as flows marked by ever-shifting capacities, not beholden to transcendental 
forms. Deleuze expanded Spinoza’s notion of relatively stable modes of existence into 
active modes of expression, the expression of difference (1990[1968]). This was a critical 
shift from the static entities associated with a metaphysics of presence.18  
Deleuze wrote extensively on his concept of the event (1988[1966]; 1994[1968]:136; 
1990b[1969]; 1986[1983]:3; 1993a[1988]). "I've tried in all of my books to discover the 
nature of events” (1997[1990]:141). Events are an important part of Deleuze’s 
commitment set; his metaethics and epistemology rest upon them; his ontology passes 
through them.  
Deleuze developed his ontological simple from the Stoics’ distinction of two kinds of 
entities, corporeal and incorporeal beings. The Stoics held that, on the one hand, there are 
bodies which exist in space and in time with their corresponding “states of affairs,” while 
__________________ 
18 In the sense that Heidegger used the term, presence, the emphasis was on the present as 
the source of knowledge, but always a knowledge of the eternal, the absolute as it is 
revealed in the now Derrida, Jacques. 1967. Of Grammatology. Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
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on the other there are incorporeal beings or transformations. These incorporeal beings 
“are not things or facts, but events. We cannot say that they exist, but rather that they 
subsist or inhere” (1990a[1969]:7). For Deleuze the event rides above the occurrence like 
a modulation of a wave. 
The event is a vibration with an infinity of harmonics or submultiples, such as an 
audible wave, a luminous wave, or even an increasingly smaller part of space over 
the course of an increasingly shorter duration (1993a[1988]:77).  
These forces, which included societies as well as persons, were not hierarchal, in the 
sense of Durkheim’s unidirectional social forces. They were not dominating but multi-
directional and enabling. The intensive power of these modes was not cancelled out or 
weakened through the imposition of constraining forces; on the contrary, they enter into 
ever more complex and heterogeneous assemblages. For Deleuze events are not “owned” 
by some transcendental subject. “There are no private or collective events, no more than 
there are individuals and universals, particularities and generalities” (1990a[1969]:152). 
Assemblages 
Assemblages are not particular members of a general category but unique and singular 
individuals, every actual assemblage is an individual singularity, defined by its properties, 
its tendencies, and its capacities at each point in time. An assemblage is always the 
product of a historical process. It is always contingent and is not guaranteed by the 
existence of a necessary set of properties constituting an unchanging essence. We can 
create an experimental space of an entire population of assemblages each possessing a 
slightly different unique immanent identity depending on the settings of the parameters. 
This population itself is also its own assemblage. 
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To the extent that a population is marked by homogeneity, it is territorialized. The more 
coded or territorialized individual assemblages are, the more they will tend to resemble 
one another. This is at the bottom of our tendency to develop categories and then to reify 
that category. Heterogeneity is achieved through a process of deterritorialization, which 
is what Deleuze would see as a process of removing the blockages of flows associated 
with political interventions based on principlism. Assemblages are overcoded when their 
range of properties are rigidly limited, decoded when these properties develop in a 
rhizomatic fashion in a more complete interaction between assemblage of individual 
modes and the assemblages of their environment. 
Mereology 
Deleuze’s mereological commitment was to an open system that resisted nomothetic 
control and formal cause. Such a system would never achieve “closure” since closure 
implied transcendence and teleology, the limits of the possible and the real. Deleuze had 
to reject “ . . . simple reductionism while also abandoning the idea of abstract classes as 
eternal archetypes” (DeLanda 2002a). 
In response, Deleuze did not limit his mereology to any one pair of domains, but 
imagined multiple levels of wholes and parts in a “flat” ontology. A flat ontology is one 
in which entities on different scales multiply act and react in complex relationships. No 
one level is privileged. Deleuze took up Whitehead’s idea of societies as complex open 
systems that operated in many mereological pairings and interacted at many levels and 
intensities. Thus, instead of a hierarchical reductionist or strongly emergent mereology, 
Deleuze saw events as modes of intensity that interacted with on each other, in all 
directions, in a type of multi-directional strong emergence. 
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Metaethics 
Deleuze’s metaethical commitments were a felicitous fit with his ontology. He 
incorporated concepts from Nietzsche’s will to power, not as pouvoir, a power of 
domination over another, but as puissance; “the ability to affect and to be affected, to 
form assemblages or consistencies, that is, to form emergent unities that nonetheless 
respect the heterogeneity of their components” (Smith 2009b). This ability to affect and 
be affected has obvious ties to his ontological simple and his mereology. However, the 
key shift in his revisionary metaethics was a move from morality to ethics (see p. 22). 
Morality presents us with a set of constraining rules of a special sort, ones that 
judge actions and intentions by considering them in relation to transcendent 
values (this is good, that's evil); ethics is a set of optional rules that assess what 
we do, what we say, in relation to the ways of existing involved (1997[1990]:100). 
Deleuze agreed with Foucault that “morality” should be understood as a series of 
restrictive rules and regulations that judge a person’s actions with reference to the 
transcendent or objective norms which he had abandoned (1997[1990]:94-101). By 
‘‘ethics,’’ in contrast, Deleuze understood a series of modes of behavior that form an 
immanent mode of existing or way of life. ‘‘Ethics, which is to say, a typology of 
immanent modes of existence, replaces Morality, which always refers existence to 
transcendent values’’ (1988[1970]:23).  
A metaethical commitment to moral realism and absolute laws would have been 
inconsistent with Deleuze’s ontology (see p. 24). For example, he could not take up 
Aristotle’s notion of morality as “the effort of man to rejoin his essence” 
(1997[1993]:127). Deleuze held that an acceptance of a transcendent morality 
represented a Nietzschean slavery and impotence reduced to its lowest point 
 80 
(1990a[1969]:152). However, Deleuze recognized the problems of relativism and 
nihilism associated with a rejection of moral principlism (Smith 1998:252, 259, 265). He 
was disturbed that “. . . in renouncing judgment we had the impression of depriving 
ourselves of any means of assessing the differences between existing beings, between 
modes of existence, as if from now on everything were equally valid (1997[1993]:168).  
In response to the danger of relativism, Deleuze proposed that we could evaluate ethical 
choices in three ways; their expansion of extension and intension of capabilities, their use 
in self-formation, or their degree of willing an affirmation.  
Ethical worth can be evaluated by the individual’s expansions of capabilities as “. . . an 
amplification, an intensification, an elevation of power, an increase in dimensions, a gain 
in distinction" (1993b[1988]:73).  A mode of existence can be evaluated, apart from 
transcendental or universal values, by the purely immanent criteria of its power or 
capacity (puissance), that is, by the manner in which it actively deploys its power by 
going to the limit of what it can do  (or, on the contrary, by the manner in which it is cut 
off from its power to act and is reduced to impotence). If modes of existence are defined 
as a degree of power (the capacity to affect and to be affected), then they can be 
evaluated in terms of the manner in which they come into possession of their power.  
Modes are no longer "judged" in terms of their degree of proximity to or distance 
from an external principle but are "evaluated" in terms of the manner by which 
they "occupy" their existence: the intensity of their power, their "tenor" of life 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994[1991]:74). 
A Deleuzean ethics asks, “What can you do, what are you capable of doing?” Deleuze 
and Guattari took up this notion of an ethics of immanence in their political works. 
Political power is about effectuating these capabilities, these powers. Under what 
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conditions, they asked, “ . . . can we be separated from our powers, or allow or actually 
desire that our powers be diminished?” (Smith 2009a:67). 
Ethical behavior can also be assessed by considering how we develop ourselves in what 
Foucault called the project of the life as a work of art. Foucault developed this concept 
from the early Stoics for whom “Ethics was not yet a business of calculation or logic”  
(Colebrook 2000:51). As Foucault found in his study of the Stoics, ethics was a practiced 
way of life; not a subservience to moral laws, but a project of self-formation. He saw this 
as an ascetic practice, not in the sense of a morality of renunciation but as “. . . an 
exercise of the self on the self by which one attempts to develop and transform oneself, 
and to attain to a certain mode of being” (Foucault and Rabinow 1997:282). 
The third evaluative approach, that of willing an affirmation, was developed from the 
Stoics’ and Nietzsche’s idea of ethics as amor fati. For Deleuze, the principal lesson of 
Stoic ethics was that of affirmation: Stoic ethics “. . . consists of willing the event as such, 
that is, of willing that which occurs insofar as it does occur” (1990a[1969]:143). “There 
is a dignity of the event that has always been inseparable from philosophy as amor fati: 
being equal to the event, or becoming the offspring of one’s own events” 
(1994[1991]:158).  
Being equal to the event means willing the event in a way that involves neither 
resignation nor ressentiment; that is affirmative; that transforms the quality of the will 
itself. His notion of an “ethics without morality” had as its central question “how to be 
worthy of the event” (1990[1968]:148-53). Deleuze did not suggest that we acquiesce 
without demurring to whatever comes our way. This was the stoicism of Lipsius, one of 
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resignation or constantia.19 Deleuze embraced a stoicism closer to that of Epictetus, a 
stoicism of affirmation. 
Moral Duty 
He did not hold for a transcendent moral realism, the prospect of moral expertise, or a 
commitment to a codified moral duty. These would have been inconsistent with his 
ontology. He took up Foucault’s argument that moral realism and moral expertise led to 
an “ethics of knowledge [whereby]  we imagine that if we get the facts about the outside 
world right, then we will know what to do” (Foucault 1969:203). Without expertise 
concerning transcendent truth-apt moral propositions, a belief in moral duty is hubristic.  
On the matter of the content or programs of moral activism or reform projects Deleuze 
was generally silent, at least in his philosophical texts (Blakley 2005). Foucault 
commented that “Deleuze and Guattari care so little for power that they have tried to 
neutralize the effects of their own discourse” (Deleuze 1994[1968]:xx). Their style had a 
Nietzschean ethical function; as if to say “we must think, but we are not asked to follow 
any authority except to think for ourselves.” Like Zarathustra, they did not want 
followers.  
__________________ 
19 “It would be a mistake to characterize Deleuze’s Stoic ethic as constantia, which we 
might translate as ‘steadfastness’ or ‘constancy.’ This notion of constance is the direct 
descendent of Lipsius’s constantia . . . Deleuze’s Stoicism is neither the Stoicism of 
Lipsius nor that of Hegel; it is rather a Nietzschean and Bousquetian Stoicism. This is not 
constantia; it is amor fati” Sellars, John. 2006. "An Ethics of the Event - Deleuze's 
Stoicism." Angelaki-Journal Of The Theoretical Humanities 11(3):157-171. 
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Epistemology 
Deleuze’s epistemology followed neatly from his ontology and metaethics (Shaviro 
2009:30-31). However, Deleuze’s epistemological commitment was not without its 
challenges. Once he had abandoned the orthodox concept of the subject as a fixed 
identity with essential and accidental properties, the standpoint of traditional 
epistemology came into question. An ontology of univocal Being and the event as 
primitive denies the traditional subject of knowing, thus “. . . epistemology must be 
demoted from the central role that it generally holds in post-Cartesian thought” (Shaviro 
2009:30-31). In response, Deleuze argued that it was the event as an immanent subject 
which put forward knowledge claims of other events as momentary constellations.  
As to a method of inquiry that would warrant propositions, Deleuze took up empiricism, 
a choice that may seem odd at first glance. The traditional concept of empiricism was that 
of a method for discovering transcendent laws or types. However, Deleuze’s empiricism 
was not an inductive method designed to “ . . . rediscover the eternal or the universal, but 
to find the conditions under which something new is produced” (2002[1977]:vii).  
Thus he developed one of the most difficult concepts in his work, that of “transcendental 
empiricism.” However, the only “transcendent” entity he recognized in his ontology was 
the immanent event; it was each unique haecceity that was transcendent. Or we might 
think of the primitive as transcendent. This was an empiricism that did not rely on some 
foundation outside experience. Instead, it was a method of empirical observation of each 
immanent flow of experience or event (Colebrook 2002:89). 
This commitment to an empiricism of immanent events required a new concept of 
perception. For Deleuze it was no longer a matter of seeking to perceive essential 
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properties and unit homogeneity by eliminating noise and radically isolating variables 
(see p. 60) in an attempt to pare away accidental properties to discover the essence of the 
social entity. In an ontology of flows and intensities Leibniz's theory of unconscious 
perceptions made more sense. Leibniz claimed that we derive our perceptions, our 
empirical observations, not from the objects around us, but rather from the minute and 
unconscious perceptions of which they are composed. My conscious perception of the 
susurrus of the sea, for example, may be clear, but it is by nature confused, because the 
minute perceptions of which it is composed are not themselves clear, but remain obscure. 
Every one of our conscious perceptions comes to us as its components reach a certain 
threshold. Our perceptions emerge from the interactions of a diverse set of these 
components and their interactions. “Inconspicuous perceptions are thus not parts of 
conscious perception, but requisites or genetic elements” (Deleuze 1993b[1988]:89). This 
epistemology aligns with his mereological and epistemological commitments, in 
particular, his principle of causation. 
Principle of Causation 
Given Deleuze’s ontological commitments, a commitment to a principle of simple, one-
to-one causation based on necessary relations would have been infelicitous. Deleuze’s 
ontology was consistent with the efficient cause (see p. 27), the “force that through the 
green fuse drives the flower” (Thomas and Jones 2003:90). On another register, he 
employed the medieval concept of an immanent cause, a cause that not only remains 
within itself in order to produce, but one whose produced effect also remains within it 
(see p. 27). This was coherent with his commitment to univocal being and his rejection of 
qualitatively different ontological planes (1990a[1969]:6-7, 33; Shaviro 2009:30). 
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Deleuze’s principle of causation also had to be consistent with his ontological 
commitment to the virtual/actual as the conditions of the “new.” As discussed above, 
Deleuze held that mere possibility causes nothing, while the virtual generates the actual. 
Considered apart from their physical causes, and independently of any bodily 
instantiation, incorporeal events were seen as the generative conditions for the very 
processes that physically give rise to them. Alongside the actual, material "connection" of 
physical causes to one another, there is also a virtual relation, or a "bond," linking 
"effects or incorporeal events" among themselves (1990a[1969]:6).  
This generative cause did not rely on necessary reason, but on Leibniz’s concept of 
sufficient reason (Shaviro 2009:34-35). The principle of sufficient reason (“everything 
has a reason”) is not the same thing as the principle of causality (“everything has a 
cause”). “Everything has a cause” means that A is caused by B, B is caused by C, and so 
on—a series of causes and effects that stretches to infinity. The principle of causality 
states the necessary cause of a thing but not its sufficient reason. Sufficient reason 
expresses the relation of the thing with its own notion, whereas causality simply 
expresses the relations of the thing with something else.  
The principle that “everything has a reason” means that one has to give a reason for 
causality itself, namely, that the relation A maintains with B must in some manner be 
included or comprised in the concept of A. That is, for every thing, there is a concept that 
gives an account both of the thing and of its relations with other things, including its 
causes and its effects. This means that everything that happens to something—all its 
“differences”—must be contained or included for all eternity in the individual notion of a 
thing. For example, “Caesar crossed the Rubicon” is a true proposition, one we hold to be 
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warranted by the method of reliable testimony. Leibniz would say that the predicate 
“crossed the Rubicon” must be contained in the concept of Caesar (not in Caesar himself, 
but in the concept of Caesar). 
Deleuze’s world was " . . . a system of echoes, of resumptions and resonances, . . . and 
not at all a necessitating causality" (1990a[1969]:170). Thus the emergence of the “new” 
rested on sufficient, but not necessary, causes for the actualization of the virtual. 
Deleuze’s principle of causation recognized what J. L. Mackie had discovered in his 
explication of INUS conditions (see p. 61). This commitment, once made, is consistent 
with a methodology and principle of causation based on unnecessary but sufficient causes, 
a principle of causation that more accurately reflects the state of affairs in the social 
world.  
Conclusions 
This chapter has highlighted how Deleuze’s commitment set is consistent with 
Whitehead’s notion of “societies” as dynamic and complex systems. Deleuze’s work 
supports a theory of such systems and explores the various thresholds at which material 
systems self-organize (that is, reduce their degrees of freedom). The relationship between 
his theories of complexity and the complexity of social systems will be taken up in the 
next chapter, which will argue for the benefits of bringing the thought of Deleuze into the 
theory and practice of sociology. 
At best, what we can derive from Deleuze and Guattari is a partial sociology, not 
in any negative sense of that term, but a montage of connections; a sociology 
without pretensions to unity or universality . . . Instead, we have a model of a 
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minor writing, subversive and subterranean, working at the molecular level, 
marking the forces of subjectification, identifying the social blockages to sense 
and desire, and mapping out lines of escape (Bogard 1998:73). 
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CHAPTER 6 – DELEUZE AND SOCIOLOGY 
The ontology and epistemology of complex social systems 
Sociology seeks to explain macroscopic social phenomena. We want to explain how the 
decentralized local interactions of heterogeneous autonomous agents could generate a 
given regularity. We approach the problem by building representations, some more 
simple than others. Verbal representations offer thick descriptions, but it is difficult to 
determine their implications. Formal quantitative representations are held to deliver more 
precise implications, but equations that could represent non-linear systems are too 
complicated to be analytically tractable. A generative approach is concerned with 
formation dynamics.; it grows the macroscopic regularity from relational events at all 
levels. The epistemic claim is: If you didn’t grow it, you didn’t explain its emergence. 
Agent-based modeling is a generative approach that employs a type of system theory.20   
The general discourse of systems theory is not new to the social sciences. However, many 
of the early instances of this theory in sociology were criticized as limited and flawed. 
For example, one theorist, Niklas Luhmann, is thought to have been an uninspiring 
ambassador of complexity theory who discouraged wider engagement in the rethinking of 
the concept of social systems (Walby 2007:3).  
There is a third wave in systems theory in sociology, that of complex social systems. A 
subset of general systems theory, complex systems have an additional set of identifying 
__________________ 
20 A system is defined as a group in which “an alteration in the properties of any one 
member would entail alterations in the properties of all the others” Acton, H. B. 1937. 
"The Theory of Concrete Universals (Ii)." Mind XLVI(181):1-13. 
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characteristics. They are dynamic, non-linear, and open, not only to new events but also 
to the surrounding environment. Complex systems necessarily produce emergent 
properties that are causally and ontologically independent. Self-organizing systems have 
no need of transcendent organizing agents, codes.  
This chapter expands on the concepts of mereology and their connections with 
complexity and chaos theories. It shows how the characteristics of complex social 
systems are best addressed by computational simulations, in particular agent-based 
modeling. Finally, it offers a practical guide to the components of agent-based models 
and examples of current applications of this method to the study of social systems.  
Complex social systems 
The study of sets of hierarchical domains and their interrelationships is the province of 
mereology. In philosophy, mereology is usually examined in mathematics and set theory. 
In sociology, this discourse is at the bottom of the debates between holists and 
individualists, in which both claim that their opponents suffer from the fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness. The debate turns on the concepts of reduction and emergence. 
Reductionism seeks to explain macrophenomena in terms of their microstructures by 
reducing theories about the former to theories about the latter. This philosophical position 
claims that only lower level properties do any work and that upper level properties are 
simply epiphenomenal. Thus, no matter how complex an object may be, an assemblage of 
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indistinguishable parts in identical relationships will produce an exact duplicate. 21 
Reductive analysis is valued for its parsimony. It offers a conceptual economy; a 
reduction in ontic commitment (Ruben 1985). However, there are a number of problems 
with “the treacherous fallacies of reduction” (Randall 1959:362).22 
One of the most telling arguments is based on the argument that like effects can be 
multiply realized by wildly disjunctive sets of antecedents (see p. 22). A sociological 
reductionist may counter to our earlier example that each instance of “acting as a church” 
is unique, the outcome of a one-to-one causal relationship, and thus not multiply realized. 
However, this suggests that what we really study are individual, immanent causal effects, 
or haecceities and not identities which can be categorized under the logic of subsumptive 
laws (see p. 26). This defeats the argument that explanation of any given social 
phenomenon tells us anything about other cases (Sawyer 2004:278). 
Emergentism opposes the reductionist position (Rueger 2000a). Emergent properties are 
said to be “novel or irreducible” with respect to the lower domain; the reductive analysis 
of complex systems is always left with a remainder (Rueger 2000b). An emergent 
property belongs to a complex as a whole and acts independently of its parts. Most 
importantly, complex systems are marked by a type of emergence known as “strong” or 
__________________ 
21 This claim turns on one’s response to the Frankenstein question: If an artifact could be 
built with the exact physical components and interrelationships of a human body, would 
the property of life suddenly emerge? 
22 C. D. Broad considers deterministic, reductionist theories too neat, and associates their 
explanation of upper-level properties with vitalistic theories and entelechies that are “too 
mysterious” even for “philosophical hierophants” Broad, C. D. 1929. The Mind and Its 
Place in Nature. Harcourt, Brace and Company. 
 91 
“ontological” (Sawyer 2004:278; Silberstein and McGeever 1999:194). These systems 
necessarily produce emergent properties that endure even if the lower parts and their 
relationships change.23  
However, emergentism is not without its own problems (Kim 2006; Sawyer 2001:552). 
For example, there is no general agreement on exactly what is it that emerges. Is it 
properties, forms, laws, entities, or some combination? (Huneman and Humphreys 
2008:426). In this regard, this paper will use the convention of emergent properties. 
Agent-based modeling 
Agent-based modeling is designed to address these dynamic, far-from-equilibrium 
complex social systems and the process of ontological emergence (Crossley 2008). It 
supports a shift from the study of causality between variables to the study of dynamic 
interactions between adaptive agents (Gilbert and Troitzsch 2005; Macy and Flache 
2002). Instead of isolating variables and restricting capabilities of agents, simulations are 
designed to manage a large set of variables and range of behaviors (Johnson 1999). 
However, agent-based modeling has yet to resolve certain problems. These can be 




23 “Neural resonant cell assemblies cohere and then fall apart on a time scale measured in 
milliseconds. But during their period of resonance they can trigger simple motor 
responses, which can trigger further real effects when picked up by the appropriate 
assemblage. They can also stay around longer and guide more complex behaviors” Bonta, 




The first mistaken presupposition is that any new sociological method or statistical 
algorithm should lead to increased certainty in our predictive power. Our culture is, on 
the whole, deeply preoccupied with certainty and foreknowledge (O'Connor 1994). 
Perhaps the most difficult task is overcome our reluctance to allow ourselves to accept  
“. . . the absence of prediction as a standard for evaluating the adequacy of a theory” 
(Lieberson and Lynn 2002:1). 
While the term “science” is overdetermined, perhaps a minimal definition might include 
the concept of structured analysis, but there is also a widely accepted notion that science 
should produce predictive certainty and control. If we begin with the assumption that 
agent-based modeling will provide these powers, the method will never meet our 
expectations. However, the problem is in the nature of the complex social systems 
themselves, not in this method, or any other approach (Boone 2011).  
Nonlinearity makes prediction, and even explanation by reduction to realizing 
mechanism, impossible (York and Clark 2007). Ever more elaborate methodologies, 
massive computing power, or an infinite number of replicative studies can not unlock the 
secrets of causally incompressible systems (Muller-Benedict 2006:137-138). Since the 
agents of these systems constantly develop new capacities and engage in new and 
different interactions, micro behaviors will always produce macro surprises. 
Complex social systems are not the subject of laws, however they do rest in temporary 
states of order. These are what the mathematician, Henri Poincaré, described as chaotic 
attractors or basins. He went on to prove that, even though we could recognize and 
describe them, we could not predict when a system would pass through these basins or 
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how long they would stay (Baker and Gollub 1996; Baker 1993; Muller-Benedict 
2006+Newman, 1996 #8932:254). 
An example might be helpful, we can consider a moving fluid as a series of events which 
must solve the problem of how to flow at different speeds. At slow speeds the solution is 
simple: stick to steady-state or uniform flow. But after a critical threshold of speed is 
crossed that solution becomes insufficient and the moving fluid must switch to a 
convective or wavy flow. Finally, after another critical threshold, the fast speeds pose a 
flow problem to the fluid that it cannot solve by moving rhythmically and it is forced to 
become turbulent. In the mathematics of complex systems this is known as a “symmetry-
breaking cascade”.  
In the laboratory of agent-based modeling we can discover a richer population of regimes 
of flow, assemblages and their interaction set. Agent-based modeling produces 
singularities which represent attractors in real systems proving the case for ontological 
emergence. This is a more accurate picture of the social world which discards the facile 
assumptions of rational choice theory concerning information availability and rational 
performance.  
While there is a level of prediction that is available in complex open systems, it is limited 
to the short-term behavior of large ensembles over localized conditions (Newman 
1996:252; Silberstein and McGeever 1999:192). For example, meteorology’s ability to 
forecast the weather with fair accuracy only applies over the next hour or so in any one 
limited space (Mathews, White, and Long 1999a:25). 
The second mistaken assumption is that the radical isolation of variables and their 
interactions is epistemically valuable (Sawyer 2004:271). This simply does not apply to 
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complex social systems. In these systems it is difficult to draw firm boundaries between 
components that are inextricably intertwined in an open environment (Bechtel and 
Richardson 1993:26-27; Bunge 2004:372). 
There are also the very real problems of standards, skill sets, and testing. The community 
of agent-based modelers has not developed a shared agreement on best practices, 
preferred platforms, or a standard language (Muller 2009; Railsback, Lytinen, and 
Jackson 2006). This problem, and other issues hamper efforts at replicative studies. In 
addition, while agent-based modeling is well suited to interdisciplinary projects, the lack 
of shared concepts and terminology among the disciplines adds a second level of 
problems to the already problematic of interdisciplinary communication (Heemskerk, 
Wilson, and Pavao-Zuckerman 2003; Rossiter, Noble, and Bell 2010). There is also a 
lack of wide agreement on standard skills and training of agent-based modelers (Levins 
1966:422-423). For example, in addition to the general knowledge and skills of a 
sociologist, it has been suggested that a modeler should also possess a sense of 
complexity theory, and past experience with software development projects and computer 
programming. 
Finally, there is a lack of standards in the testing, verification, and validation of agent-
based models. There are no formalisms that are easily rehearsed. It is simply difficult to 
test complex social systems which feature a heterogeneity of agents, and the 
unpredictable emergence of novel patterns of macro behavior (Midgley, Marks, and 
Kunchamwar 2007). However, agent-based modeling is developing new approaches to 
testing models of complex social systems (Kuppers and Lenhard 2005; Moss and 
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Edmonds 2005; Ormerod and Rosewell 2006; Terano 2007 +Fehler, 2005 #11399; 
Windrum, Fagiolo, and Moneta 2007). 
Process and advantages 
There is a structured process for the design and modification of an agent-based modeling 
project. The first step is to select a target system and define the environment, or 
experimental space. This is a matter of scope; for example an anthropologist may want to 
begin with a model of one phratry, and then expand the scope to a certain number of 
tribes and their interactions. The environmental sociologist may want to start with an 
experimental space with a certain level of renewable resources. In each case the model 
can be programmed to represent tendencies, capacities, or preferences of each individual 
and group.  
Next, the modeler develops an inventory of agents for the population of the experiment. 
These can be animate as well as inanimate, individuals or groups. Agents are each given 
various cognitive and sensory capabilities, such as the ability to interact with all or some 
of the other agents; to reason, evaluate, remember, learn, and develop new capacities. 
Logical algorithms that represent these parameters are developed and implemented in 
software programs (Brent and Thompson 1999; Kluver, Schmidt, and Stoica 2005).  
There is a valued role for sociologists in agent-based modeling, even those limited to 
their current level of training in mathematics and systems theory. The method is 
improved when it is used in combination with existing quantitative and qualitative 
research in sociology (Halpin 1999; Janssen and Ostrom 2006+Parunak, 1998 #2024; 
Johnston, Kim, and Ayyangar 2007; Matsuyama and Terano 2010). As we saw earlier, 
orthodox methods can drive the specification of behavior rules for agents. This, in turn, 
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can lead to an expanded research process in which variable analysis describes, 
mechanisms explain, and simulation activates (as well as tests) hypothetical mechanisms 
(Manzo 2007:37).  
Thus the entire process benefits from the results of previous qualitative and quantitative 
social science research. The interpretation and selection of agent types and capabilities 
are important tasks for the sociologist and other social scientists in the team. These data 
from traditional research help the designers develop the initial capabilities and tendencies 
of the population of the target system. This research gives the model a running start, as it 
were. The body of data also serves as a form of validation of the results of the initial runs. 
A widely cited example of this is the agent-based modeling study whose parameters were 
modified until it replicated the results of archaeological models of the process of the 
growth and collapse of the Kayenta Anasazi (Axtell, Epstein, Dean, Gumerman, 
Swedlund, Harburger, Chakravarty, Hammond, Parker, and Parker 2002). From this 
“validation” the model can then be used in other social and ecological systems. The 
parameters are modified until the model replicates the findings of traditional quantitative 
and qualitative research on these new systems. This leads to a stronger descriptive and 
explanatory powers of the interactions and attractors of both systems.  
However, it is important to understand that such findings are just preambles to the 
model’s real power, the power of the true experimental method (Edmonds and Hales 
2005). Unlike quasi-experiments, we really can change, for example, an agent’s religious 
preferences with no complaints from the board of ethical treatment of subjects, or even 
the agent herself! In addition, we can change just one aspect of the agent and the mythical 
ceteris paribus rules actually apply. The team can conduct a series of simulation runs, 
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evaluate the results, and perform other experiments by adjusting parameter values and 
developing new variables. For example, a model can be configured to produce results that 
align with a hypothesis developed in traditional research in one target area. Then we can 
investigate why that same hypothesis has not produced similar results in another target 
area (time, location, culture). 
The capabilities, and their diminution or growth, of immanent modes of intensity can be 
modified through the assignment of particular parameter values. For example, a recent 
experiment in agent-based modeling sought to understand and explain how extremism 
propagated in different societies (Deffuant, Amblard, Weisbuch, and Faure 2002). The 
model set one parameter as the range of certainty and uncertainty of an agent’s beliefs. 
The use of a high value of certainty represented extremist agents with higher persuasive 
capabilities. Depending upon the choice of other parameters, the extremists could have a 
very local influence or attract the whole population. Of course, the model employed 
many more capacities, such as persistence and preferential attachment, each with their 
own range of values. This ability to accept new agents and aspects of interactions allows 
the researcher a wide range of experimental freedom. How these findings are used is 
another matter, our interventionism is a function of our metaethics, as we will see below. 
Another recent experiment, regarding the analysis of agricultural policy (Happe and 
Kellermann 2007), featured other capacities and parameter values. Agri-environmental 
measures are examples of policies which farmers are free to choose to adopt or not. The 
environmental sociologists on the team had established a relationship between the 
acceptance of policies and the influence of other farmers and of more or less 
institutionalized contacts. The experiment built capacities for the strength of 
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neighborhood, professional and random social networks, their frequency of interactions, 
and their influence. In addition, particular nodes of the social network were given 
different capabilities to initiate the discussions and propagate and diffuse information. 
There are a number of practical uses for the results of agent-based modeling. For example, 
agent-based models can present counterintuitive hypotheses which can lead to new lines 
of research. A set of apparently bizarre, or widely disjunctive, individual agent rules may 
generate macrostructures that unexpectedly mimic the observed ones. It may be that these 
latter relationships point to what are, in fact, the operative micro-rules. On the other hand, 
a model based on widely accepted explanations of particular macrophenomena may 
actually not corroborate the expected results and lead us to new hypotheses.  
For example, in the research on the propagation of extremism, the model showed that a 
single convergence phase state, formed around one extreme belief set, can occur after a 
phase of strong consensus at a moderate opinion, with an almost equal interest for both 
extremes. Moreover, in the case of large uncertainties, it is rather the more central agents 
which tend to drive the drift to the extremes, whereas the closest to the extremes tend to 
go to the center. Neither of these results was expected based on more widely accepted 
hypotheses.  
However, one of the most powerful advantages of agent-based modeling experiments is 
their ability to produce a range of longitudinal data that far surpasses what our current 
methodologies are able to collect and analyze. Access to new levels of computing power 
allows simulation runs with a large number of agents, capabilities, and hundreds of 
thousands of interactions. Thus, agent-based modeling can produce results based on the 
interactions of agents over several years or more. This can lead to the appearance and 
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study of Poincaré ’s basins, as temporary phase states, that coalesce, diffuse, and 
dissipate over a long life cycle. In addition, the ability to run many simulations with the 
same parameters produces results that are best understood through the application of 
mainstream statistical methodology. There begins a synergistic iterative loop between the 
two methods.  
As we saw in Chapter 4, sociology began with an ontology and epistemology that led to 
what has been criticized as a scientistic rationale. In the following section we look to the 
metaethics that led us to adopt a moralistic identity. There is a discussion of the 
metaethics that act as the foundation of our moral interventionism. This chapter ends with 
a review of Deleuze’s metaethics and questions where they might lead us. 
The metaethics of interventionism 
Sociology’s early metaethical commitments were a response to the requirements of our 
constituency and its interest in scientific support of policies of moral reform. This led us 
to a commitment to moral principlism; the belief that there are real and absolute moral 
principles that “provide prescriptive action guides for moral conduct; they require that 
agents do certain actions when certain conditions obtain” (Davis 1995:88).  
The theory of moral principlism has many flaws. The prospect of gleaning a clear 
prescriptive guide for moral action from a diverse set of principles that often conflict is 
practically impossible. Consider the sociologist who seeks guidance on requiring a 
change in certain moral conventions by the members of a certain culture chosen as an 
object of intervention. Richard B. Davis suggests a complicated process which might 
begin with the sociologist forming  
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. . . empirical beliefs about the particulars of a case, and conceptual beliefs 
concerning each principle's constitutive concepts. The next step, I take it, would 
be to attempt to bring these sets of beliefs into wide reflective equilibrium (by an 
alchemy that is not entirely clear) with her own considered moral principles and 
philosophical beliefs - an enormously difficult task. The result of this procedure, 
presumably, would be a particular moral judgment (susceptible of precise 
formulation) (Davis 1995:97). 
This result determines what the agents of the sociologist’s target culture ought or ought 
not to do, as well as what moral actions she is required to take. It is not clear to what 
degree moral interventionists regularly engage in this tiresome process. The 
interventionist is more often governed by a preference for one particular moral principle 
(“autonomy” is seldom the principle of choice) and characterizes her or his targets as 
suffering from false consciousness or misrecognition of the inaccuracies of their own 
moral principles. These “mistaken” beliefs and behaviors tend to appear as anecdotal 
artifacts in the sociologist’s quantitative or qualitative analysis.  
Principled interventions 
Whatever principle(s) animates our meliorism, it is generally held that intervention is 
only warranted as a response to serious injustice. For example, there are three proposals 
for a logic of the “just war”. In the case of “just war” theory, the subject is military 
intervention, but, as sociologists, we understand there is more than one kind of violence 
that can be visited on a target culture. 
John Rawls claims that sovereignties are open to outside intervention if they violate rules 
that all participants would adopt in a hypothetical negotiation. It should be noted that the 
hypothetical negotiation is one in which no participant has a surfeit of bargaining power. 
It is this condition that is most often neglected in the practice of interventions at all levels. 
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He argues that intervention is not permitted in cultures that are “well-ordered.” States can 
be well-ordered in liberal terms, or well-ordered to the extent they are “decent”, in 
Rawl’s term, meaning in the sense that they act to advance the common good. Rawls 
shows his normative preferences when he defines decent states as those in which “society 
is the employer of last resort” and there is “public financing of elections” (1999:62). He 
holds that decent states do not have to provide democratic political rights. For example, a 
state can be decent even if it doesn’t give women the vote as long as the government 
consults with women’s groups. 
Today the generally accepted form of moral authorization of a just intervention rests on 
the principle of human rights. A systematic violation of the human rights of those within 
its borders deprives a government “of the sovereign right to non-intervention, so that 
intervention, including armed intervention, is permissible” (Miller 2003:223). The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations in 1948, 
is the generally accepted standard in the West for determining violations of human rights. 
24  
Human rights projects rely on the central power of institutions and doctrines. Moira 
Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd suggest that contractualist accounts of human society are 
what Spinoza would call “social fictions” whose “resilience lies in their ability to 
stabilize institutions that, in turn, confer identities on the individuals whom they 
__________________ 
24 Yet the UDHR has not received complete international ratification. For example, the 
governments of Sudan, Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia criticized the UDHR for its 
perceived failure to take into the account the cultural and religious context of Islamic 
countries. In response, this group ratified the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in 
Islam, which protects human rights in accordance with the Islamic Shari’ah.   
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ostensibly serve” (1999:5). 25  For example, Rosi Braidotti characterizes the current 
political climate as a Neo-liberal Post-feminism which leads to one type of “liberation.” 
“Our women” (Western, Christian, mostly white and raised in the tradition of 
secular Enlightenment) are already liberated and thus do not need any more social 
incentives or emancipatory policies. “Their women”, however, (Non-Western, 
non-Christian, mostly not white, and alien to the Enlightenment tradition) are still 
backwards and need to be targeted for special emancipatory social actions or even 
more belligerent forms for enforced “liberation” (2005:171). 
Principlism is based on the logic of covering laws. This, in turn, depends on the notion of 
absolute identities for the unit homogeneity required for its proper implementation. This 
is accomplished through a commitment to a metaphysics of identity that valorizes the 
“normal.” Nancy Fraser refers to this as the “identity model” of recognition, which, she 
suggests, leads to an identity politics which substitutes 
. . . intrusive forms of consciousness engineering for social change, positing group 
identity as the object of recognition, and it puts moral pressure on individual 
members to conform to group culture (2001:24).  
Identity politics treats cultures as sharply bounded, neatly separated and non-interacting. 
The result is often the imposition of the single, drastically simplified group persona, 
which is needed for interventions based on human rights. Such a persona denies the 
complexity and the multiplicity of individual identifications.  
A Deleuzean ontology and metaethics produces a politics that is about escaping 
overcoded and essentialist identities and generalities. It is not aimed at the goal of 
__________________ 
25 Giorgio Agamben suggests that central institutions gain force from their ability to 
name the exception Agamben, Giorgio. 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare 
Life. Stanford University Press.; certain moral and cultural identities are constituted as 
pathological to the normal identity established by totalizing narratives. 
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traditional revolutions, that of gaining a seat at the table for oppressed identities. The 
process of establishing a new identity model aimed at constraint while the people are still 
“shooting at clocks”. On the contrary, in Deleuze’s term, it promotes an insurrection 
which can not begin until the individual refuses any form of essentialist identity. Deleuze 
rejects moral codes in favor of ethical becomings and suggests this achieves a more 
significant change in political arrangements. 
Deleuze and interventionism 
Deleuze is suspicious of universal and sedentary moral principles and, in this regard, 
questions the uses made of rights talk in the contemporary world. Deleuze is not opposed 
to rights as such, but only to the idea that there exists a definitive set of human rights 
grounded in some rights-bearing feature of human nature. Human rights “say nothing 
about the immanent modes of existence of people provided with rights” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1994, 107). When we speak of human rights as eternal, abstract and 
transcendent they end up belonging to everyone and no one in particular. He sees 
specifications of human rights as empty universals, useless because the codified rights are 
fixed and ahistorical, unable to evolve in accordance with the requirements of a particular 
case.  
Human rights are axioms. They can coexist on the market with many other 
axioms, notably those concerning the security of property, which are unaware of 
or suspend them even more than they contradict them . . . A great deal of 
innocence or cunning is needed by a philosophy of communication that claims to 
restore the society of friends, or even of wise men, by forming a universal opinion 
as "consensus" able to moralize nations, States, and the market (1994[1991]:107).  
He argues that universal coordinates such as “rights” explain nothing; what need to be 
analyzed in a concrete assemblage are the processes by which rights are both created and 
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critiqued. It is not a question of universal rights; it is a question of a situation, and a 
situation that is evolving. Deleuze takes up the concept of jurisprudence as a model for 
the creation of rights that are not universal, but always linked to a given assemblage and 
the particularity of specific cases or singularities.  
Axiomatic systems of laws, once established, are fraught with undecidable cases. The law 
thus operates on two registers: legislators create laws and decide on axioms, rules; while 
the judiciary moves from case to case, from singularity to singularity. Cases that resist the 
imposition of axioms wind up in the courts, before a judge, who in the end must make a 
judgment in the absence of any rule. Jurisprudence is an ongoing and open-ended creative 
process that leads to the modification of existing laws and the invention of new rights. 
Deleuze argues that situations which are targeted for intervention must be considered as 
cases to be decided, rather than simply subsumed under what he sees as sedentary 
universal codes of laws.  
To act for freedom, becoming revolutionary, is to operate in jurisprudence when 
one turns to the justice system . . . that's what the invention of law is. . . . It’s not a 
question of applying “the rights of man” but rather of inventing new forms of 
jurisprudence (1995: G as in “Gauche”). 
Majoritarian, minoritarian politics 
How do we engage in insurrection by jurisprudence? The answer arises from Deleuze’s 
ontological and metaethical commitments. The key concept here is Deleuze’s notion of 
events as processes of becoming, as employed in a minoritarian politics (Deleuze 
1987[1980]:232-309). A majoritarian politics occurs when one flow blocks or constrains 
other flows, in such a manner that it brings the latter under the dominance of a single 
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flow capable of “overcoding” or “capturing” them. 26  Deleuze sees this as a 
“territorialization” in which the majoritarian politics constrains how individuals can 
interact with the political environment by limiting their intensive capabilities.  
A Deleuzean “becoming” is always a matter of becoming something other than what is 
offered by the dominant conceptual categories of a given society. Deleuze’s becoming-
minoritarian refers to the potential of individuals or groups to deviate from the standard, 
to become abnormal, perhaps to be categorized as Durkheimian pathologies. It expresses 
the sense in which individuals and societies never entirely conform to the majoritarian 
standard but exist in a process of continuous variation (1987[1980]:106). For Deleuze, 
"reterritorializing" forces seek to maintain order while "deterritorializing" forces work to 
subvert that order. Deterritorialization is a form of resistance, a continual process of 
change that denies essence. Deleuze sees societies as  
. . . composed of various lines or vectors of territorialization and 
deterritorialization which need . . . to be interpreted in a given context in order to 
discover how to proceed (May 2001:§20). 
The process of deterritorialization provides “a normative framework within which to 
describe and evaluate movements or processes” (Patton 2000:136). We can remember 
Deleuze’s method of evaluating ethical acts (see p. 79). Becoming-minoritarian is a “long 
labour which is aimed not merely against the state and the powers that be, but directly at 
ourselves” (2002[1977]:138). That is, the positive, active development of the capacities 
of Spinoza’s dynamic, de-centered subjects to interact, to affect and be affected. For an 
__________________ 
26 “Forms of sociability built on capture rely on the habituated world passing as the only 
possible world” Gatens, Moira. 2000. "Feminism as "Password": Rethinking the 
"Possible" with Spinoza and Deleuze." Hypatia 15(2):59-75. 
 106 
individual, as a series of modes of intensity, to preserve itself and to act in an ethical 
manner is  
. . . precisely for it to act and be acted upon in a multiplicity of ways. The more 
complex the individual body, the more ways in which it can be affected and affect 
other things (Gatens and Lloyd 1999:27). 
Deleuze argues that these capacities are always a target of constraint by majoritarian 
politics as it seeks to expand its control and overcoding. One example is Foucault’s 
societies of discipline with their principal techniques of enclosure (prisons, hospitals, 
schools, factories, barracks, families). Deleuze suggests that majoritarian politics no 
longer operate by enclosure alone but are now utilizing societies of control, that is, 
reterritorialization by continuous control and instantaneous communication. Control 
societies modulate the flows of bodies through open spaces, regulating the bodies as they 
move through the borders and thresholds of the various spaces (1990).27 What may 
become increasingly important for deterritorializing forces is the development of 
capacities "to create vacuoles of noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can elude 
control" (Deleuze 1997[1990]:175). But as Deleuze insists, one can never predict in 
advance where these loci of experimentation will occur; one can only be attentive to the 
unknown that is knocking at the door.  
There is no need to ask which is the toughest or most tolerable regime, for it's 
within each of them that liberating and enslaving forces confront one another. For 
example, in the crisis of the hospital as environment of enclosure, neighborhood 
clinics, hospices, and day care could at first express new freedom, but they could 
participate as well in mechanisms of control that are equal to the harshest of 
__________________ 
27 “Enclosures are molds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-
deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a 
sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point . 
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CHAPTER 7 – SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Disciplines, such as sociology, are built on philosophical frameworks composed of 
ontological, metaethical, and epistemological commitments. The internal coherence and 
external authenticity of these sets of beliefs enhance a discipline’s powers of description, 
explanation, and even prediction (to the extent it is available). When commitments fit one 
to another, in a felicitous manner, the commitment set is said to be internally consistent 
or logically valid. A theory’s external validity is a function of how well its set of 
commitments provides an authentic view of what is the case. The commitment set of the 
foundational beliefs of American sociology, influenced by the forces of its early 
institutionalization, are marked by infelicitous fits. This has led to a failure of our early 
nomothetic ambitions and an inconsistent foundation for the practice of moral 
interventions. 
Influenced by the Progressive Era, American sociology took on a moralistic identity and 
a scientistic rationale that continue today. It is not difficult to trace the genealogy of these 
characterizations of sociology. The quest for the institutionalization of sociology in 
America did not take place in a laboratory vacuum. These two positions reflect 
commitments to specific first principles in metaethics, ontology, and epistemology. 
Metaethical commitments to moral realism, moral expertise, and moral duty inform our 
moralistic identity and our particular approach to interventionism. Ontological 
commitments to ideal types and universal laws imagined a mechanistic social world. 
Epistemological commitments to unit homogeneity, simple causation, a deductive-
nomological logic, and radical decontextualization led to sociology’s variant of the 
scientific method. These ontological and epistemological commitments combined to 
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provide a scientistic rationale for the discipline of sociology that is reflected in our 
methods to this day. 
In this concluding chapter, my emphasis is on how a revisionary metaphysics could 
influence our practice, how sociological theory could gain a purchase on our methods and 
interventions. Although it is late in the day, this chapter tries to answer the sociologist’s 
questions of “What is to be done?” or “What difference will all this make?” or, perhaps, 
for the weary reader, “Can the winged seed finally come to ground?”  
 
In this paper I have chosen to make a Deleuzean reading of Durkheim and of Deleuze 
himself. This is an approach that “inhabits” its subject and creates a new event, in the 
Deleuzean sense of the term. Deleuze was fond of beginning his arguments and 
explications with the expression “following”, as in “following Leibniz”, and then going 
on to make this or that knowledge claim of his own. He followed the flow of a writer’s 
thoughts as they moved through other events, or other modes of intensity, such as other 
writers, other discourses, other practices. I have “followed” Durkheim in this manner. He 
was chosen because he most clearly enunciated the underlying philosophical issues of 
metaethics, ontology and epistemology of early sociology and proposed a set of 
foundational beliefs in these areas that continue to influence the general practice of 
American sociology to this day.  
This is not to say that there has been a paucity of original or revisionary thinkers in 
sociological theory. Throughout the development of American sociology, the discourse of 
theory has been rich and varied. Given more time and stamina, we could investigate the 
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contributions of Gabriel Tarde, Judith Butler and Bruno Latour, to name just a few. We 
could “follow” these writers in the same sense. 
However, it has been noted that, in sociology, theory often resides closer to the tail of the 
dog. While our theory has developed at one pace, the ways in which we practice our 
research and implement our interventions have changed in a much slower rhythm. This is 
because these practices still embrace the foundational beliefs and first principles adopted 
by early sociology. In the actual practice of sociology, these commitments have been 
relatively unchallenged, in this regard we have followed Durkheim perhaps too closely.  
In an attempt to disturb these assumptions, I have chosen to focus on Deleuze, rather than 
our own theorists, for three reasons. First, he began with an investigation of pure 
philosophy and the fundamental issues of metaethics, ontology and epistemology. He has 
taken a longer view toward the genealogy of Western assumptions. Second, he has 
created a set of principles that are logically sound, and externally valid for the state of 
affairs in the social world, a world of complex social systems. Finally, while other 
philosophers have worked in what Deleuze calls a “minor philosophy” in the alternative 
tradition of immanence, Deleuze has followed that discourse on to the ontology and 
epistemology of complex systems and the metaethics of an alternative interventionism. 
Conclusions 
However much sociology may want to dismiss charges of a scientistic rationale, they do 
not want to go away. There is a continuing belief that sociology’s quantitative 
methodology has not delivered on its early nomothetic promises. Critics of our status as a 
science claim that we are actually scientistic, that is, we have adopted the trappings of 
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science for the sake of science alone. This is the claim that we maintain a commitment to 
the logic of a particular science even while that approach continues to produce what can 
be seen as trivial and limited research results and warrants.  
Most of sociology is not scientific in the sense in which this term is used in 
English-speaking countries. It contains little of importance that is rigorously 
demonstrated by commonly accepted procedures dealing with relatively 
reproducible observations. Its theories are not ineluctably bound to its data. The 
standards of proof are not stringent (Shils 1970:760). 
Many prominent sociologists criticize the assumptions at the bottom of their discipline’s 
methodological claims. The cogency of our methodology is ultimately evaluated by “ . . . 
the accuracy with which it identifies and tracks the determinant properties and processes 
of the phenomena to be explicated” (Bryant 2004:451). If our methods of inquiry fail to 
cut the world at its joints, then we should reinvestigate our principles of ontology and 
epistemology (Katz 2002). 
 
The underlying difficulty in sociology’s research practices lies in its ontological and 
epistemological commitments to representation. There is a belief that sociology should 
pursue exact, certain social knowledge by developing an ever more detailed map of social 
representations. Such a “map” does not recognize the dynamic nature of complex social 
systems nor the unavailability of absolute types. Consider the short story by Jose Luis 
Borges, “Inexactitude in Science”. 
In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of a 
single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, the 
entirety of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, 
and the Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of 
the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it. The following 
Generations, who were not so fond of the Study of Cartography as their Forebears 
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had been, saw that that vast Map was Useless, and not without some Pitilessness 
was it, that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters. In the 
Deserts of the West, still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited by 
Animals and Beggars; in all the Land there is no other Relic of the Disciplines of 
Geography (1999:325). 
Sociology could not resist the temptation of chasing the dream of Borges’ Cartographers, 
the dream of complete and overarching representation. “People are constantly putting up 
an umbrella that shelters them and on the underside of which they draw a firmament and 
write their conventions and opinions” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994:203-4). We could take 
an entirely different view. Consider Lewis Carroll’s story of a map similar to Borges’, 
also on the scale of a mile to the mile. When asked if that map had been much used,  a 
character replied:  
It has never been spread out, yet: the farmers objected: they said it would cover 
the whole country, and shut out the sunlight! So we now use the country itself, as 
its own map, and I assure you it does nearly as well (2010:162-163). 
We could forego the representations of a philosophy of identity and use the actual 
complex systems and its chaotic behavior as our research model. The concept of 
representation by itself is not completely at fault, rather it is the Platonic concept of 
representations, and their essential properties, that are held to reveal eternal Ideas and 
categories. Problems are introduced when we think of representations as imperfect copies 
of some immutable form or type. We can come to a new sense of representation when we 
consider alternative ontological and epistemological first principles. In Deleuze’s 
ontology representations do not stand in for absolutes that lurk in the shadows. Each 
unique individual representation is its own absolute, its own Idea, each immanent event 
represents itself and nothing else. These are what Deleuze called haecceities (see p. 20).  
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We might think that a philosophy of immanence as representations as haecceities leaves 
us with a methodological and epistemological paradox. If all that exists are unique 
entities, if there are no types or categories, how can we learn anything of any lasting 
value? If there is no identity of sets of likes, no agreement in essential properties, what 
can we say about any other entity? How can we translate our knowledge to other systems 
and assemblages?28 This goes back to the problems of uniformity and regularity, that is, 
how do we explain putative likes and causal patterns? 
If we are to move to a science that matches the state of affairs in the social world, we 
should begin with a move to an ontology of events as a series of assemblages (see p. 77) 
operating in complex social systems. These assemblages are temporary local phenomena, 
and thus represent the opposite end of the temporal continuum from the (relatively) long-
term congealed structures that have formed the primary subject matter of classical 
network analysis. The intensive differences of Deleuze and the concrescences of 
Whitehead offer new ontological commitments to complex social systems that are both 
self-organizing and self-actualizing (Robinson 2005:171). The ontological and 
epistemological commitments of Deleuze can help us to address the immanent relational 
event as a new unit of study.  
If we move to a new ontology of immanence, events and assemblages, than a retention of 
our traditional epistemology would produce an inconsistent and illogical fit between our 
ontological and epistemological commitments. A more consistent epistemology would 
__________________ 
28 “The richness and necessity of translations include as many opportunities for openings 
as risks of closure or stoppage” Deleuze, Gilles. 1987[1980]. A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia. University of Minnesota Press. 
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commit to a principle of dynamic and complex causation, abandoning the limited 
Durkheim world of necessary causes, and adopt Leibniz’s notions of sufficient reason 
(see p. 85). We must challenge our current principle of simple linear causation, one  that 
is recognized as outmoded even in the “hard” sciences. The mathematician Ian Stewart 
explains the genealogy of linear causation.  
So docile are linear equations, that classical mathematicians were willing to 
compromise their physics to get them. . . . Linearity is a trap. The behavior of 
linear equations is far from typical. But if you decide that only linear equations 
are worthy of thinking about, self-censorship sets in. Your textbooks fill with 
triumphs of linear analysis, its failures buried so deep that the graves go unmarked 
and the existence of the graves goes unremarked (1989). 
If we make these changes to our ontological and epistemological commitments, the 
logical methodological commitments would support approaches that recognize an 
ontology of complex systems and an epistemology of sufficient reason. One approach 
would involve the addition of tools such as agent-based modeling. Agent-based modeling 
simulations produces singularities which represent attractors in real systems proving the 
case for ontological emergence. This is a more accurate picture of the social world, a 
picture which denies the facile assumptions of rational choice theory concerning 
information availability and rational performance.  
Another advantage of agent-based modeling is that, while it employs representations, it 
does not adopt the ontology of representation on which our traditional linear methods rest. 
As a model, it recognizes the practical need for representations of immanent events even 
though it knows these representations will always and already be incomplete. Agent-
based modeling does not claim to completely do away with the problems of 
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representation. Rather it simply improves on our linear methods in all the ways discussed 
in chapter 6 (see pp. 95). It does this by its alignment with a Deleuzean ontology. 
As Lewis Carroll noted, the world itself does just fine as a map of the present. However, 
one charter of sociology as a science is to describe and explain the behavior of social 
change. If our methodology is largely restricted to localized and synchronic studies, we 
limit our descriptive and explanatory powers. Agent-based modeling is designed to bring 
the diachronic into sociological research. It does this not by seeking to catalogue the 
infinite sets of interactions and states of immanent events, but by providing a method that 
expands our sets of variables, properties, interactions, and time frames. Agent-based 
modeling is not the complete answer and it is not meant to completely replace our 
traditional methods. However, it offers us a more authentic picture of complex social 
systems.  
The study of these systems requires an investment in a new type of quantitative 
methodology and a new approach to mathematics. 
In the physical sciences, mathematical theory and experimental investigation have 
always marched together. Mathematics has been less intrusive in the life sciences, 
possibly because they have until recently been largely descriptive, lacking the 
invariance principles and fundamental natural constants of physics (May 
2004:790). 
Agent-based modeling allows mathematics to “intrude” in the social sciences in a new 
manner, one that is not based on invariance and constants. It celebrates agent 
heterogeneity. It commits to a principle of dynamic and multirelational causation. It seeks 
the recognition of order rather than the establishment of predictive laws (Macy and 
Willer 2002). It understands that sociology’s descriptive and explanatory powers will 
remain limited “. . . as long as we try to understand living systems by the methods of the 
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familiar equilibrium statistical mechanics” (Prigogine, Nicolis, and Babloyantz 1972:23-
24). 
Our vision of nature is undergoing a radical change towards the multiple, the 
temporal and the complex. For a long time a mechanistic world view dominated 
western science. In this view the world appeared as a vast automaton. . . . We are 
[now] becoming more and more conscious of the fact that on all levels, from 
elementary particles to cosmology, randomness and irreversibility play an ever 
increasing role (Prigogine 1984:xxvii). 
Our critics have noted the ethics of our interventions, but also the ethics of a science that 
is used to maintain the status quo. Deleuze offers a new model of science that would 
cause a shift in this approach. He proposes a typology of “state” or “royal”, “nomad”, and 
“ambulatory” sciences. These all relate to how the sciences can be used in political and 
moral interventions.  
The Royal social sciences adopt the methodology of scientific reductionism, which is an 
expression of the analytic, extensive state science. State science extracts laws and 
constants from the variations of matter. Royal science focuses on the reductive and 
extensive. The state seeks to “tame” the potential turbulence of hydraulic forces. To this 
reductive approach, Deleuze proposes the alternative of a nomad science which rejects 
the science based on a philosophy of identity. “. . . what is proper to royal science is to 
isolate all operations from the conditions of intuition, making them true intrinsic concepts 
or ‘categories’” (Deleuze 1987[1980]:373). 
One does not go by specific differences from a genus to its species, or by 
deduction from a stable essence to the properties deriving from it, but rather from 
a problem to the accidents that conditions it and resolve it. (Deleuze 
1987[1980]:362). 
Nomad science focuses on the expressive and the intensive,. Nomad science is based on a 
“hydraulic” model of flows of energy and matter, a vortical model. Ambulatory sciences, 
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such as metallurgy, surveying, stonecutting subordinate all their operations to the sensible 
conditions of intuition and construction, they “follow” the flow of matter. For example, 
geography, as an ambulatory science, wrests history from the cult of necessity in order to 
stress the irreducibility of contingency. It rescues it from the cult of origins in order to 
affirm the power of a “milieu” . 
A Deleuzean ontology and epistemology can improve our methodology. His notion of 
royal and nomad sciences addresses the problems of a scientistic rationale driven by an 
individual’s moral principles. Can his metaethics offer an alternative to a our moralistic 
interventionism?  
Sociologists do not carry guns in the front lines of military interventions, nor are they 
asked to participate in the executions of terrorists. This is not to say that sociology has 
eschewed all pretensions of moral interventionism. The work of most sociologists reflects, 
at some level, assertoric or even apodictical normative propositions. Bringing the 
metaethical foundations of these propositions forward for critical investigation has not 
been the general practice. However, the real problem is that sociology has chosen 
metaethical beliefs that are ill-suited for moral interventionism. If sociology seeks to 
oppose oppression, basing the campaign on a commitment to moral realism leaves one 
armed with universal, immutable, and thus “oppressive” codes. It can put sociologists in 
the role of Derrida’s  
“ . . . humanitarian paratroopers, human rights combined with the right of 
intervention as the sole means of assistance, the full bellied Western fortress 
giving moral lessons to those starving the world over, the morose dictatorship of a 
narrow oligarchy of financiers, professional politicians and TV presenters” 
(Badiou 2011:3-4). 
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The transcendent Idea capable of imposing it likeness upon a rebellious matter (Deleuze 
1994[1968]:128). Hence the contradictory nature of moral improvement by imposing 
Western principles such as a historical, and what we see as progressive, series of 
oppression of population assemblages of slaves, ethnicity, gender, the subaltern. Our 
adoption of normative attitudes or principles toward each of these groups rests on the 
concept of the oppression or the other, or the political management of the non-citizen. 
One aspect of this series is the awarding of moral regardability to each population in turn 
as it reaches a threshold of moral awareness. This series is not absolute, we do not how it 
will proceed. What future populations will come to be awarded moral regardability as an 
absolute property? Currently arguments for the moral regardability of animals and Gaia 
are being put forth in the discourse of animal rights and environmentalism, respectively. 
One does not seek universals in order to judge but singularities that are capable of 
creating, of producing the new.  
This is perhaps the secret, to make something exist, and not to judge. If it is so 
distasteful to judge, this is not because everything is equally valid, but on the 
contrary because everything that is worthy can only create and distinguish itself 
by defying judgment (Deleuze 1997[1993]:169).  
What is to be done with our practice? 
While our theoretical discourse has pursued a revisionary metaphysics, this has not been 
the case in the practice of sociology, that is, how we research and how we intervene. The 
difference between theory and methodology in our discipline is that the former has 
resolutely challenged its foundational beliefs, while the latter has focused on the 
pyrotechnics of its superstructure with its ever more complicated algorithms. Our 
research practices have not sought to critically examine our ontological and 
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epistemological commitments. Likewise, our practice of social interventionism has not 
exhibited an interest in a revisionary metaethics. The question is how might we make 
changes in the practice of research and intervention. 
 
First, what is to be done with our methodology? The first step is to critically investigate 
the ontological and epistemological foundational beliefs on which our traditional 
approaches are built. The tactical answer is that we will be best served by adding agent-
based modeling to our traditional methods. Therein is the rub. The natural sciences, since 
about the 17th century, tended to embrace revolutionary research technologies as opposed 
to refining the existing instruments. The social sciences have remained remarkable loyal 
to their traditional quantitative methodology. “What is fundamentally lacking in the 
social sciences is a genealogy of research technology, whose manipulation reliably 
produces new phenomena and a rapidly moving research front” (Collins 1994:155).  
However, sociology’s methodology is its most rigid panoply, its identity as a science. The 
institutionalization of sociology in America was achieved on the establishment of a 
unique subject and well marked academic borders. When a  
. . . community is based principally on keeping people out and on defending a tiny 
fiefdom (in perfect complicity with the defenders of other fiefdoms) on the basis 
of a mysteriously pure subject's inviolable integrity then it is a religious 
community (Said 2002:175).  
William Connolly makes a similar observation when he says that methodological debates 
are “ . . . akin to religious ones, and like religious ones, conversions are possible, but faith 
is often durable even in the face of disconfirming evidence” (Connolly 2004:10). 
Alasdair MacIntyre notes that in order to maintain this practice of paradigm protection 
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there must be a source of authority. He argues that a key element in what he calls the 
ideology of sociology as an organization is “. . . the conventional methodology of the 
social sciences. One key function of this ideology is to sustain bureaucratic authority” 
(1998[1979]:53).  
Should we get past this resistance, there are more practical problems, such as sociology’s 
requirements for acceptance into our graduate programs. If computational simulations 
require a higher level of mathematical aptitude, our adoption of this method will raise the 
bar for graduate students in sociology. However, our current standards are relatively lax. 
Graduate students accepted into sociology departments achieve relatively low GRE 
scores, exceeding only those of students entering departments of education (Lipset 1994). 
Edward Shils is even harsher in his analysis of our standards for mathematical or 
scientific aptitudes, arguing that the quantitative methodology of sociology is an 
industrial research model, “which can be taught to persons of mediocre ability and 
practiced by them with apparently productive results” (Shils 1970:794).  
Thus, the introduction of an additional quantitative method, such as agent-based 
modeling, into sociology’s curriculum will not be a simple matter. There are two possible 
alternatives. First, sociology could continue its strategy of certifying sociologists as 
independent quantitative experts by expanding their tool set. This may mean significant 
changes in the methods curricula for advanced degrees in the social sciences. The 
inclusion of specialized computational methods tracks may be required.  
On the other hand, sociology could recognize that the skill set for agent-based modeling 
may be too broad to expect that one discipline alone could prepare independent experts. 
In fact, agent-based modeling is well suited for interdisciplinary projects. In this approach, 
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research might sometimes require sociologists to partner with experts in dynamic systems 
and computational modeling from the life sciences or even the hard sciences. In this 
approach, sociologists are valued for their expertise in the methods of traditional 
sociological research, as well as the sociological imagination. 
What is to be done with our interventionism? 
Michael R. Hill argues that adopting an activist, emancipatory ideological position 
obligates social scientists to, at the very least, critically review their axiological 
commitments and epistemological premises (1984). Unfortunately, sociology’s graduate 
students receive little guidance in these topics, and it is not clear if they are ever asked to 
consider these questions.29 Attention to moral reasoning is limited to short workshops in 
the ethical treatment of research subjects. Little attention is given to the moral reasoning 
that determines the ethical treatment of the objects of our interventions. If sociology 
wants to respond to criticisms of its moralistic identity, it should look to its metaethical 
commitments, and encourage this conversations in its graduate curricula. 
Final comments 
A belief is at fault if the state of affairs it asserts does not obtain in the world. The 
sedentary scientific thought of sociology rests in a settled phase which recognizes degrees 
of immobility and immutability in things. Deleuze’s ontology and epistemology offers a 
way out. 
__________________ 
29 Perhaps it is thought to be invasive, or perhaps droll or facetious, to question a graduate 
student’s guiding moral propositions, or even her moral reasoning. 
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. . . the overriding interest of Deleuze and Guattari’s nomad thought is to 
understand how the immobility and immutability in things might be unhinged so 
that new kinds of individual and social being can emerge (Patton 2006:37).  
An engagement with the metaethical first principles of Gilles Deleuze can lead us to a 
new understanding of sociology as  
. . . a model of a minor writing, subversive and subterranean, working at the 
molecular level, marking the forces of subjectification, identifying the social 
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